Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS

Economists Voice Pub Date : 2011-02-14 DOI:10.2202/1553-3832.1821

Christophe Chamley, B. Pinto

引用次数: 17

Abstract

Christophe Chamley of Boston University and Brian Pinto of the World Bank use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal (insolvency) problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.

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为什么官方救助往往不起作用:以2010年希腊为例

波士顿大学的Christophe Chamley和世界银行的Brian Pinto用希腊最近发生的事件来说明，当国家存在根本性的财政(“破产”)问题时，官方救助往往不起作用，并构建了一个两期的数值例子来解释为什么这不应该令人感到意外。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economists Voice ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

25.00%

发文量

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