The Economists' New Arguments

IF 3 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Brett H. Mcdonnell
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper is a review and critique, in dialogue form, of Fairness versus Welfare, by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. It raises a number of concerns about the book. Kaplow and Shavell argue that all normative legal policymaking arguments should be grounded in a welfarist approach, that is, they should focus only on how different policies will affect human welfare. They produce a formal argument that any fairness theory (which they define as a theory which does not rely exclusively on welfare) will under some circumstances prefer a policy which makes everyone worse off, and hence we should reject all fairness theories. The book's argument is tautological and convincing only to those whose intuitions already favor welfare over fairness; indeed, Kaplow and Shavell's formal proof of the inconsistency between fairness and welfare can equally validly be used to argue that one should follow a fairness approach rather than the welfarist approach which Kaplow and Shavell prefer. Kaplow and Shavell argue that consistency requires that if one rejects fairness in favor of welfare in the examples they present, then one is committed to rejecting fairness in favor of welfare in all instances. However, there are other, well-known examples where utilitarian and welfarist approaches lead to objectionable results - Kaplow and Shavell's notion of consistency suggests that we should therefore reject welfarism in all instances. Kaplow and Shavell try to explain away intuitions favoring fairness as having an evolutionary origin - in most instances, fairness intuitions and norms advance efficiency. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that therefore when the fairness norms and efficiency conflict, efficiency should triumph. The paper argues that such evolutionary explanations are not always right, and even when they are, we may have other reasons to follow fairness norms anyway. Moreover, the link between fairness norms and efficiency suggests reasons why universal adoption of a welfare approach may reduce welfare.
经济学家的新论点
本文以对话的形式对路易斯·卡普罗和史蒂文·沙维尔的《公平与福利》进行了回顾和批判。这引发了人们对这本书的许多担忧。Kaplow和Shavell认为,所有规范性的法律政策制定论点都应该以福利主义的方法为基础,也就是说,他们应该只关注不同的政策将如何影响人类的福利。他们提出了一个正式的论点,即任何公平理论(他们将其定义为不完全依赖福利的理论)在某些情况下都会倾向于一种使每个人都更糟的政策,因此我们应该拒绝所有公平理论。这本书的论点是重复的,只有对那些直觉上已经倾向于福利而不是公平的人才有说服力;事实上,Kaplow和Shavell对公平和福利不一致的正式证明同样可以有效地用来论证人们应该遵循公平的方法,而不是Kaplow和Shavell所倾向的福利主义方法。Kaplow和Shavell认为,一致性要求如果一个人在他们提出的例子中拒绝公平而支持福利,那么他就会致力于在所有例子中拒绝公平而支持福利。然而,还有其他一些众所周知的例子表明,功利主义和福利主义的方法会导致令人反感的结果——Kaplow和Shavell的一致性概念表明,我们应该在所有情况下拒绝福利主义。Kaplow和Shavell试图将支持公平的直觉解释为具有进化起源——在大多数情况下,公平直觉和规范促进了效率。因此,Kaplow和Shavell认为,当公平规范和效率发生冲突时,效率应该获胜。这篇论文认为,这种进化的解释并不总是正确的,即使它们是正确的,我们也可能有其他理由遵循公平准则。此外,公平规范和效率之间的联系说明了为什么普遍采用福利方法可能会减少福利。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: In January 1917, Professor Henry J. Fletcher launched the Minnesota Law Review with lofty aspirations: “A well-conducted law review . . . ought to do something to develop the spirit of statesmanship as distinguished from a dry professionalism. It ought at the same time contribute a little something to the systematic growth of the whole law.” For the next forty years, in conjunction with the Minnesota State Bar Association, the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School directed the work of student editors of the Law Review. Despite their initial oversight and vision, however, the faculty gradually handed the editorial mantle over to law students.
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