{"title":"Tiebout Goes Global: International Migration As a Tool for Voting with Your Feet","authors":"I. Somin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3535767","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I. INTRODUCTION Students of federalism have long recognized that citizens in a federal system can \"vote with their feet\" by moving from one jurisdiction to another. (1) Those oppressed or harmed by the policies of one regional government can improve their lot by moving to another. Such \"exit rights\" are an important alternative to traditional \"voice\"-based political participation through voting. (2) In a classic 1956 article, Charles Tiebout pointed out that foot voting can also help citizens find jurisdictions that more closely approximate their preferred mix of taxes and public services. (3) While foot voting cannot work perfectly so long as there are moving costs, (4) it does enable many people to choose which jurisdiction to live in and thereby decide which policies they wish to live under. However, scholars have so far failed to systematically consider the implications of foot voting and the Tiebout model for international migration. Although much research addresses the economic and human rights issues raised by movement across international boundaries, there has been very little discussion of its utility as a form of political participation through exit rights. Some scholars have argued for stronger international migration rights on deontological moral grounds. (5) Others advocate such changes because they are likely to greatly increase the well-being of migrants from repressive and underdeveloped societies, and also provide economic benefits to the societies that take them in. (6) Two economists have recently considered the implications of the Tiebout model for empirical explanations of international migration induced by fiscal policy differences between nations in the European Union. (7) The existing literature has not, however, addressed the full normative implications of the Tiebout model and foot voting for migration between nation-states more generally. In this article, I make a tentative effort to plug this hole in the literature. I suggest that the benefits of international foot voting may well be much larger than those of free movement within national borders. Part II briefly summarizes the theory of foot voting and its potential benefits. I focus particularly on the use of exit rights as a form of political participation by which migrants can more effectively choose the public policies under which they live. Crucial benefits of political participation through exit rights include the matching of public policy to diverse preferences, the creation of an outlet for local political minorities and discriminated-against groups, competition between jurisdictions for migrants, and improved incentives for information acquisition relative to traditional ballot box voting. In Part III, I show how these benefits are potentially much greater for international migration than for domestic migration within advanced democracies. Public policies differ far more across nations than within national boundaries. Free international migration therefore provides a much greater potential range of options for migrants than domestic movement. In addition, international migration may be the only feasible form of political choice for the hundreds of millions of people who live under undemocratic governments. For these unfortunate individuals, emigration may be the only means they have for choosing the public policies they wish to live under, short of violent revolution. Part IV considers some possible implications for migration law. Current international law requires nations to allow their citizens free exit, but does not require free entrance except in extremely limited circumstances. Unfortunately, the frequent denial of entry rights greatly undercuts the value of exit rights. To reap the full benefits of international foot voting, barriers to entry should be reduced. I do, however, suggest one set of situations in which the theory of foot voting may in some instances justify restricting rights of entry: cases where free migration might undermine the very policies that make the nation in question attractive to migrants in the first place. …","PeriodicalId":82026,"journal":{"name":"Missouri law review","volume":"73 1","pages":"13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Missouri law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3535767","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION Students of federalism have long recognized that citizens in a federal system can "vote with their feet" by moving from one jurisdiction to another. (1) Those oppressed or harmed by the policies of one regional government can improve their lot by moving to another. Such "exit rights" are an important alternative to traditional "voice"-based political participation through voting. (2) In a classic 1956 article, Charles Tiebout pointed out that foot voting can also help citizens find jurisdictions that more closely approximate their preferred mix of taxes and public services. (3) While foot voting cannot work perfectly so long as there are moving costs, (4) it does enable many people to choose which jurisdiction to live in and thereby decide which policies they wish to live under. However, scholars have so far failed to systematically consider the implications of foot voting and the Tiebout model for international migration. Although much research addresses the economic and human rights issues raised by movement across international boundaries, there has been very little discussion of its utility as a form of political participation through exit rights. Some scholars have argued for stronger international migration rights on deontological moral grounds. (5) Others advocate such changes because they are likely to greatly increase the well-being of migrants from repressive and underdeveloped societies, and also provide economic benefits to the societies that take them in. (6) Two economists have recently considered the implications of the Tiebout model for empirical explanations of international migration induced by fiscal policy differences between nations in the European Union. (7) The existing literature has not, however, addressed the full normative implications of the Tiebout model and foot voting for migration between nation-states more generally. In this article, I make a tentative effort to plug this hole in the literature. I suggest that the benefits of international foot voting may well be much larger than those of free movement within national borders. Part II briefly summarizes the theory of foot voting and its potential benefits. I focus particularly on the use of exit rights as a form of political participation by which migrants can more effectively choose the public policies under which they live. Crucial benefits of political participation through exit rights include the matching of public policy to diverse preferences, the creation of an outlet for local political minorities and discriminated-against groups, competition between jurisdictions for migrants, and improved incentives for information acquisition relative to traditional ballot box voting. In Part III, I show how these benefits are potentially much greater for international migration than for domestic migration within advanced democracies. Public policies differ far more across nations than within national boundaries. Free international migration therefore provides a much greater potential range of options for migrants than domestic movement. In addition, international migration may be the only feasible form of political choice for the hundreds of millions of people who live under undemocratic governments. For these unfortunate individuals, emigration may be the only means they have for choosing the public policies they wish to live under, short of violent revolution. Part IV considers some possible implications for migration law. Current international law requires nations to allow their citizens free exit, but does not require free entrance except in extremely limited circumstances. Unfortunately, the frequent denial of entry rights greatly undercuts the value of exit rights. To reap the full benefits of international foot voting, barriers to entry should be reduced. I do, however, suggest one set of situations in which the theory of foot voting may in some instances justify restricting rights of entry: cases where free migration might undermine the very policies that make the nation in question attractive to migrants in the first place. …