Tiebout Goes Global: International Migration As a Tool for Voting with Your Feet

I. Somin
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

I. INTRODUCTION Students of federalism have long recognized that citizens in a federal system can "vote with their feet" by moving from one jurisdiction to another. (1) Those oppressed or harmed by the policies of one regional government can improve their lot by moving to another. Such "exit rights" are an important alternative to traditional "voice"-based political participation through voting. (2) In a classic 1956 article, Charles Tiebout pointed out that foot voting can also help citizens find jurisdictions that more closely approximate their preferred mix of taxes and public services. (3) While foot voting cannot work perfectly so long as there are moving costs, (4) it does enable many people to choose which jurisdiction to live in and thereby decide which policies they wish to live under. However, scholars have so far failed to systematically consider the implications of foot voting and the Tiebout model for international migration. Although much research addresses the economic and human rights issues raised by movement across international boundaries, there has been very little discussion of its utility as a form of political participation through exit rights. Some scholars have argued for stronger international migration rights on deontological moral grounds. (5) Others advocate such changes because they are likely to greatly increase the well-being of migrants from repressive and underdeveloped societies, and also provide economic benefits to the societies that take them in. (6) Two economists have recently considered the implications of the Tiebout model for empirical explanations of international migration induced by fiscal policy differences between nations in the European Union. (7) The existing literature has not, however, addressed the full normative implications of the Tiebout model and foot voting for migration between nation-states more generally. In this article, I make a tentative effort to plug this hole in the literature. I suggest that the benefits of international foot voting may well be much larger than those of free movement within national borders. Part II briefly summarizes the theory of foot voting and its potential benefits. I focus particularly on the use of exit rights as a form of political participation by which migrants can more effectively choose the public policies under which they live. Crucial benefits of political participation through exit rights include the matching of public policy to diverse preferences, the creation of an outlet for local political minorities and discriminated-against groups, competition between jurisdictions for migrants, and improved incentives for information acquisition relative to traditional ballot box voting. In Part III, I show how these benefits are potentially much greater for international migration than for domestic migration within advanced democracies. Public policies differ far more across nations than within national boundaries. Free international migration therefore provides a much greater potential range of options for migrants than domestic movement. In addition, international migration may be the only feasible form of political choice for the hundreds of millions of people who live under undemocratic governments. For these unfortunate individuals, emigration may be the only means they have for choosing the public policies they wish to live under, short of violent revolution. Part IV considers some possible implications for migration law. Current international law requires nations to allow their citizens free exit, but does not require free entrance except in extremely limited circumstances. Unfortunately, the frequent denial of entry rights greatly undercuts the value of exit rights. To reap the full benefits of international foot voting, barriers to entry should be reduced. I do, however, suggest one set of situations in which the theory of foot voting may in some instances justify restricting rights of entry: cases where free migration might undermine the very policies that make the nation in question attractive to migrants in the first place. …
《全球化:国际移民是你用脚投票的工具
学习联邦制的学生早就认识到,联邦制下的公民可以“用脚投票”,从一个司法管辖区搬到另一个司法管辖区。那些被一个地方政府的政策压迫或伤害的人可以通过迁移到另一个地方来改善他们的命运。这种“退出权”是传统的以投票为基础的“发言权”政治参与的重要替代方案。(2)在1956年的一篇经典文章中,Charles Tiebout指出,徒步投票还可以帮助公民找到更接近他们所喜欢的税收和公共服务组合的司法管辖区。(3)尽管只要存在迁移成本,脚投票就不能完美地起作用,(4)它确实使许多人能够选择住在哪个司法管辖区,从而决定他们希望在哪种政策下生活。然而,到目前为止,学者们还没有系统地考虑脚投票和Tiebout模型对国际移民的影响。虽然许多研究涉及跨国流动所引起的经济和人权问题,但很少有人讨论跨国流动作为一种通过退出权进行政治参与的形式的效用。一些学者在道义基础上主张加强国际移民的权利。(5)另一些人主张这样的改变,因为它们可能会大大增加来自专制和不发达社会的移民的福祉,并为接纳他们的社会提供经济利益。(6)两位经济学家最近考虑了Tiebout模型对欧盟国家间财政政策差异引起的国际移民的实证解释的影响。(7)然而,现有的文献并没有解决Tiebout模型和更普遍的民族国家之间移民的脚投票的全部规范含义。在本文中,我将尝试填补这一文献空白。我认为,国际脚投票的好处很可能远远大于国内自由流动的好处。第二部分简要总结了脚投票的理论及其潜在的好处。我特别关注将出境权作为一种政治参与形式的使用,通过这种形式,移民可以更有效地选择他们所生活的公共政策。通过退出权参与政治的关键好处包括公共政策与不同偏好相匹配,为当地政治少数群体和受歧视群体创造出口,各司法管辖区之间对移民的竞争,以及相对于传统投票箱投票而言,信息获取的激励机制得到改善。在第三部分中,我展示了这些好处对国际移民的潜在影响远大于发达民主国家的国内移民。国家之间的公共政策差异远远大于国家内部的差异。因此,自由的国际移徙为移徙者提供了比国内移徙大得多的潜在选择范围。此外,对于生活在不民主政府之下的数亿人来说,国际移民可能是唯一可行的政治选择形式。对于这些不幸的人来说,除了暴力革命之外,移民可能是他们选择他们希望生活在其中的公共政策的唯一手段。第四部分考虑了对移民法可能产生的影响。目前的国际法要求各国允许其公民自由出境,但除非在极其有限的情况下,否则不要求自由入境。不幸的是,频繁的拒绝入境权大大削弱了出境权的价值。为了获得国际脚投票的全部好处,应该降低进入壁垒。然而,我确实提出了一组情况,在这些情况下,脚投票理论可能在某些情况下证明限制入境权是合理的:在这些情况下,自由移民可能会破坏最初使有关国家对移民具有吸引力的政策。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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