From a Protectionist Party to a Church Party, 1846-48: Identity Crisis of the Conservative Party and the Jew Bill of 1847*

Albion Pub Date : 2004-06-22 DOI:10.2307/4054215
Hee-Chang Chung
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This article investigates the influence of the Maynooth and Repeal crises on Conservative politicians after 1846 and the putative maintenance of their identity as defenders of the Church after the Disruption of the party. Historians of the Conservative party have long realized that it suffered from a crisis of identity for a long time after 1846. Some of the leading Peelites were heading more and more towards the Liberal party, and most backbench Peelites gradually joined the Protectionist party; but the Protectionists did not have enough experienced leaders to qualify for the inheritance. Norman Gash has argued that "the Protectionists were not a political party in the sense of one able to provide and sustain a Government in the circumstances of the mid-nineteenth century....The weakness of the Protectionists was not merely that after 1846 they represented the Conservative party with most of the brains knocked out, but that until they could shake off the monolithic character implied by their title, they could scarcely hope to become a national party or form a viable Government."' Likewise Robert Stewart and John Ramsden consider that the Protectionists were unable to take the place of the Conservative party, given their lack of effective and experienced leaders.2 It is undeniable that the Protectionist party was not as strong as the Conservative party had been in terms of executive capacity or party organization. But to say also that it was unable to inherit the mantle of Conservatism is to fall into the same trap as Gash and to exaggerate the importance of Peelite executive ability. More significant is the fact that the party of Stanley and Disraeli maintained fidelity to the core principles of the Conservative party-i. e. the constitution of Church and State, and the principle
从保护主义政党到教会政党,1846-48年:保守党的身份危机和1847年的犹太人法案*
本文调查了1846年后梅努斯危机和废除危机对保守党政治家的影响,以及该党分裂后他们作为教会捍卫者的身份的假定维护。保守党的历史学家早就意识到,该党在1846年之后的很长一段时间里遭受了身份危机。一些主要的佩尔精英越来越倾向自由党,而大多数后座的佩尔精英逐渐加入了保护主义党;但贸易保护主义者没有足够有经验的领导人来继承遗产。诺曼·加什(Norman Gash)认为,“在十九世纪中期的情况下,保护主义者不是一个能够提供和维持政府的政党....保护主义者的弱点不仅在于他们在1846年之后代表了大多数头脑被淘汰的保守党,而且在他们能够摆脱其头衔所暗示的单一性格之前,他们几乎不可能希望成为一个全国性的政党或组建一个可行的政府。同样,罗伯特·斯图尔特和约翰·拉姆斯登也认为,保护主义者无法取代保守党,因为他们缺乏有效和有经验的领导人不可否认的是,保护主义党在执行能力和政党组织方面都不如保守党强大。但是,说它无法继承保守主义的斗篷,就是落入了与Gash相同的陷阱,并且夸大了Peelite执行能力的重要性。更重要的是,斯坦利和迪斯雷利的政党对保守党的核心原则保持了忠诚。(五)教会和国家的构成及其原则
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