Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will

L. Buchheit, G. Gulati, A. Mody
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引用次数: 100

Abstract

One hundred years ago in the United States, confronted by the urgent need to find a debt workout procedure for large corporate and railroad bond issuers, the financial community looked at three options: amend the U.S. bankruptcy law to permit reorganizations (the predecessor of today's Chapter 11), not just liquidations of the debtor companies; include contractual provisions in the underlying bonds that would allow a restructuring of those instruments with the consent of a supermajority of the bondholders; or pursue a court-supervised debt restructuring by engaging the equitable powers of the civil courts to oversee such a process. A century later, confronted by the urgent need to find a debt workout procedure for sovereign bond issuers, the same three options are open for discussion. The International Monetary Fund is actively studying the possibility of constructing, at the supranational level, the equivalent of a "Chapter 11 for countries." The use of contractual provisions to facilitate sovereign debt workouts - an idea whose time had visibly not come even just a few years ago - is being reconsidered by both the sovereign borrowers and the institutional bondholder community in the light of Argentina's catastrophic debt default in December 2001. Resort to the equitable powers of the civil courts to oversee creditor-led sovereign debt workouts is, we believe, possible in appropriate circumstances. This article looks at the existing contractual provisions in sovereign bonds and the existing U.S. legal procedures in order to explore how far these may be enlisted to further the goal of orderly sovereign debt rearrangements. This article concludes that these existing contractual provisions and civil procedures - if used creatively and confidently - can go much further toward achieving this goal than conventional wisdom would suggest.
主权债券和集体意志
一百年前的美国,面对迫切需要为大型公司和铁路债券发行人找到一个债务整顿程序的问题,金融界考虑了三个选择:修改美国破产法,允许重组(今天的第11章的前身),而不仅仅是清算债务公司;在基础债券中加入合同条款,允许在获得绝对多数债券持有人同意的情况下对这些工具进行重组;或者通过民事法院的公平权力来监督这一过程,寻求法院监督的债务重组。一个世纪后,面对迫切需要为主权债券发行人找到一个债务重组程序的问题,同样的三个选择可供讨论。国际货币基金组织(imf)正在积极研究在超国家层面构建相当于“针对各国的第11章”的可能性。鉴于2001年12月阿根廷灾难性的债务违约,主权借款人和机构债券持有人都在重新考虑利用合同条款来促进主权债务重组的想法。就在几年前,这种想法显然还没有出现。我们认为,在适当的情况下,利用民事法院的衡平法权来监督债权人主导的主权债务重组是可能的。本文着眼于主权债券中现有的合同条款和现有的美国法律程序,以探讨这些条款在多大程度上可以促进有序主权债务重组的目标。本文的结论是,这些现有的合同条款和民事程序-如果创造性地和自信地使用-可以比传统智慧所建议的在实现这一目标方面走得更远。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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