Functional Corporate Knowledge

Mihailis E. Diamantis
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The line between guilt and innocence often turns on what a defendant knew. While the law’s approach to knowledge may be relatively straightforward for individuals, its doctrines for corporate defendants are fraught with ambiguity and opportunities for gamesmanship. Corporations can spread information thinly across employees so that it is never “known.” And prosecutors can exploit legal uncertainties to bring knowledge-based charges where corporations were merely negligent in how they handled information. While knowledge as a mens rea has unique practical and normative properties that vary with a corporation’s size and industry, corporate law treats knowledge just like any other mental state and uses the same doctrine for all corporations. Commentators dissatisfied with that doctrine have overlooked an obvious resource: social epistemology, i.e. the formal study of group knowledge states. As a result, it has missed a crucial distinction—between knowledge and information—at the root of ambiguities and inefficiencies in the law and proposed reforms. This Article is the first to draw on the tools of social epistemology and organizational science to develop a functional theory of corporate knowledge. Its goal is to validate the legislature’s frequent choice of knowledge as a mens rea while also inducing corporations of all sorts to process information at socially optimal levels. Critical to the analysis are the incentives corporations have to (mis)manage information, the public cost of corporate crime, and the private cost of corporate compliance. A functional approach to corporate knowledge would eschew the binaries of current doctrine in favor of a sliding test keyed to two factors: 1) “effort,” i.e. the cost of information management, and 2) “obviousness,” i.e. how peer corporations would perform with respect to the same information. The resulting theory is flexible enough to fine tune incentives for corporations of all sizes and industries while also intuitively capturing what culpable knowledge means in the corporate context.
功能性企业知识
有罪与无罪的界限往往取决于被告知道什么。虽然法律对知识的处理方法对个人来说可能相对简单,但它对企业被告的原则却充满了模糊性和耍花招的机会。公司可以在员工之间分散信息,这样就永远不会被“知道”。检察官可以利用法律上的不确定性,对企业仅仅在处理信息方面存在疏忽的情况提出基于知识的指控。虽然知识作为一种犯罪行为具有独特的实用性和规范性,并随公司规模和行业的不同而变化,但公司法对待知识就像对待任何其他精神状态一样,并对所有公司使用相同的原则。对这一学说不满的评论家忽视了一个显而易见的资源:社会认识论,即对群体知识状态的正式研究。结果,它忽略了一个关键的区别——知识和信息之间的区别——这是法律和拟议改革中模棱两可和低效的根源。本文首次利用社会认识论和组织科学的工具来发展企业知识的功能理论。它的目标是验证立法机构经常选择知识作为一种手段,同时也诱使各种各样的公司以社会最优水平处理信息。分析的关键是企业管理信息的动机、企业犯罪的公共成本和企业合规的私人成本。企业知识的功能性方法将避免当前学说的二元性,而支持一个滑动测试,以两个因素为关键:1)“努力”,即信息管理的成本;2)“明显性”,即同行企业如何处理相同的信息。由此产生的理论具有足够的灵活性,可以对各种规模和行业的企业进行激励调整,同时也能直观地捕捉到在企业背景下有罪知识的含义。
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