The impact of Machiavellianism and the trustfulness of the victim on laboratory theft.

Sociometry Pub Date : 1976-06-01 DOI:10.2307/2786216
W. Andrew Harrell, Timothy Hartnagel
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引用次数: 93

Abstract

Eight-four male subjects, participating in a simulated work situation, had the opportunity to make money honestly or to steal from a second subject serving as a supervisor. In half the cases the supervisor doubted the subject's honesty and made frequent inspections of his work in the first half of the experiment. The remainder of the subjects were exposed to a trusting supervisor who regarded the subjects as honest and did not exercise opportunities to inspect. Subject's level of Machiavellianism was also measured. It was predicted that the norm of responsibility would inhibit subjects from stealing from a trusting supervisor who was dependent on them. Past research led us to expect greater theft from the distrustful supervisor. These hypotheses were supported. Also supported were our hypotheses that high Machiavellians, who conform less to conventional norms and exploit situations where the risk of sanctioning is small, would steal more overall than low Machiavellians, particularly from the trusting supervisor. It was concluded that only close forms of supervision would deter high Machiavellians while low Machiavellians would remain honest if left unsupervised in positions of "trust. "
马基雅维利主义和受害者的信任对实验室盗窃的影响。
84名男性受试者参加了一个模拟的工作环境,他们有机会诚实地赚钱,或者从另一个担任主管的受试者那里偷钱。在一半的情况下,主管怀疑受试者的诚实,并在实验的前半段频繁检查他的工作。其余的受试者被置于一个信任的主管面前,他认为受试者是诚实的,不利用机会检查。实验对象的马基雅维利主义水平也被测量了。据预测,责任规范会抑制受试者从依赖他们的信任主管那里偷东西。过去的研究表明,我们预计不信任的主管会有更多的盗窃行为。这些假设得到了支持。我们的假设也得到了支持,即高马基雅维利主义者不太遵守传统规范,利用制裁风险小的情况,总体上比低马基雅维利主义者偷窃更多,尤其是从信任的主管那里。结论是,只有严密的监督才能阻止高级马基雅维利主义者,而低级马基雅维利主义者如果在“信任”的职位上不受监督,就会保持诚实。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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