Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities

D. Barbieri, W. Edward
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引用次数: 19

Abstract

Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) campaigns and public discussions about community benefits are becoming the norm in deciding how large urban projects are built outside of formal public land use approvals. CBAs have revolutionized land use approvals for large, public-private economic development projects: now developers and coalitions representing low-income communities can settle their disputes before formal project approval. As a result, CBAs are now commonplace nationwide.Legal scholarship, however, has failed to keep up with these important developments. This Article aims to do just that by examining how CBAs, when properly negotiated, lower transaction costs, enhance civic participation, and protect taxpayers. It argues that CBAs achieve all these outcomes well, and more efficiently than existing government processes. Indeed, this Article’s central argument is that to the extent that scholars have analyzed CBAs, their analyses have gone astray by either dismissing CBAs as harmful to communities or by focusing on the role of the state in negotiating what really should be a private contract between a coalition of community groups and a developer. It is a mistake to give the state’s role in CBAs primacy over the community coalition because the inclusion of government in the CBA bargaining process creates a host of constitutional protections for developers — namely that the community benefits must be connected to and proportional with the instant government approval.This Article places focus back on CBAs as private contracts enforceable by inclusive and representative community coalitions. It presents a case study of a successful CBA negotiated for the development of the Kingsbridge National Ice Center in the Bronx. This Article proposes a framework for assessing the impact of CBAs in economic development — one that recognizes the nuanced role that states and municipalities play in the formation and enforcement of CBAs. The framework focuses on the extent to which CBAs (1) lower transaction costs by effectively resolving disputes among developers and community groups, (2) increase civic participation in public processes, (3) protect taxpayers, and (4) avoid government intervention and constitutional protections for developers. This Article concludes with recommendations for the appropriate, limited role of government in CBA negotiations.
社区福利协议对社区有益吗
社区利益协议(CBA)运动和关于社区利益的公众讨论正在成为决定大型城市项目如何在正式的公共土地使用批准之外建设的标准。cba已经彻底改变了大型公私经济发展项目的土地使用审批:现在,代表低收入社区的开发商和联盟可以在正式的项目批准之前解决他们的纠纷。因此,cba现在在全国都很普遍。然而,法律学术未能跟上这些重要的发展。本文旨在通过研究cba在适当谈判时如何降低交易成本,增强公民参与和保护纳税人来做到这一点。它认为,cba可以很好地实现所有这些结果,而且比现有的政府程序更有效。事实上,本文的核心论点是,就学者们分析cba的程度而言,他们的分析已经误入歧途,要么认为cba对社区有害,要么关注国家在协商社区团体联盟与开发商之间真正应该是私人合同的过程中所扮演的角色。将州政府在CBA中的作用置于社区联盟之上是错误的,因为将政府纳入CBA谈判过程为开发商创造了许多宪法保护——即社区利益必须与政府的即时批准相关联并成比例。本文将重点放在cba作为可由包容性和代表性社区联盟强制执行的私人合同上。它提出了一个成功的CBA谈判开发布朗克斯国王桥国家冰上中心的案例研究。本文提出了一个评估cba对经济发展影响的框架,该框架认识到州和市政当局在cba的形成和执行中发挥的微妙作用。该框架关注cba在多大程度上(1)通过有效解决开发商和社区团体之间的纠纷来降低交易成本,(2)增加公民对公共过程的参与,(3)保护纳税人,以及(4)避免政府干预和对开发商的宪法保护。本文最后对政府在CBA谈判中适当的、有限的作用提出了建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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