Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation

IF 3.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Manning
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

In recent years, the Supreme Court has embraced a freestanding federalism that is not tied to any particular clause of the Constitution. Rather, because multiple clauses assume the continued existence of states and set up a government of limited and enumerated powers, the Court has inferred that such provisions collectively convey a purpose to establish federalism and to preserve a significant degree of state sovereignty. The Court has treated that general background purpose as a warrant to derive specific but unenumerated limitations on federal power – in particular, a federalism clear statement rule, an anticommandeering principle, and broad state sovereign immunity from suit in state courts. This Article argues that the interpretive methodology underlying the new federalism cases cannot readily be squared with the process insights clearly articulated by the Court in its recent statutory interpretation cases, which endorse the related propositions that lawmaking entails compromise, that enacted texts select means as well as ends, and that abstracting from a law’s specific means to its general aims dishonors the level of generality at which lawmakers choose to legislate. Despite evident differences between statutes and the Constitution, this Article maintains that where, as in the new federalism cases, the Court purports to attribute its holdings to decisions made by the founders pursuant to the processes prescribed by Articles V or VII, its interpretive approach should proceed from the premise that constitutionmaking involves process considerations analogous to those that characterize legislation. Constitutionmaking entails disagreement and compromise by stakeholders who have the right to insist upon compromise as the price of their assent. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution itself represents “a bundle of compromises” and, in the particular area of interest here, quite elaborately spells out the means by which power is to be divided between the federal and state governments. Indeed, emphasizing that federalism was an innovation of our Constitution, this Article maintains that the specific means chosen to implement our form of concurrent sovereignty in fact define the concept of federalism and that, contrary to the Court’s recent cases, there is no freestanding federalism.
联邦制与宪法解释中的普遍性问题
近年来,最高法院接受了一种独立的联邦制,不受宪法任何特定条款的约束。相反,由于多个条款假定各州继续存在,并建立了一个有限和列举权力的政府,法院推断,这些条款共同传达了建立联邦制和维护相当程度的国家主权的目的。法院将这一一般背景目的视为对联邦权力施加具体但未列举的限制的理由,特别是联邦制明确声明规则、反强占原则以及在州法院免于诉讼的广泛的州主权豁免。本文认为,新联邦主义案例背后的解释方法不能轻易地与法院在其最近的法定解释案例中明确阐述的过程见解相一致,这些案例支持相关命题,即立法需要妥协,制定的文本选择手段和目的,从法律的具体手段抽象为其一般目的,这有损立法者选择立法的普遍性水平。尽管成文法和宪法之间存在明显的差异,但该条坚持认为,在新的联邦制案件中,当最高法院试图将其判决归因于开国元勋根据第五条或第七条规定的程序作出的决定时,其解释方法应基于这样一个前提,即宪法制定涉及类似于立法特征的程序考虑。制宪需要利益相关者的分歧和妥协,他们有权坚持妥协作为他们同意的代价。此外,美国宪法本身代表了“一系列妥协”,在这里感兴趣的特定领域,它相当详细地阐明了在联邦政府和州政府之间分配权力的方式。事实上,该条强调联邦制是我国宪法的一项创新,它坚持认为,为实现我们的共同主权形式而选择的具体手段实际上定义了联邦制的概念,与最高法院最近的案件相反,不存在独立的联邦制。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
11.80%
发文量
1
期刊介绍: The Harvard Law Review is a student-run organization whose primary purpose is to publish a journal of legal scholarship. The Review comes out monthly from November through June and has roughly 2,500 pages per volume. The organization is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions and, together with a professional business staff of three, carry out day-to-day operations. Aside from serving as an important academic forum for legal scholarship, the Review has two other goals. First, the journal is designed to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. Second, it provides opportunities for Review members to develop their own editing and writing skills. Accordingly, each issue contains pieces by student editors as well as outside authors. The Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts. All articles — even those by the most respected authorities — are subjected to a rigorous editorial process designed to sharpen and strengthen substance and tone.
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