How Can Russia Contribute to Peace in Korea

Abstract

This article examines what contribution, if any, Russia can make to peace on the Korean Peninsula. It begins by assessing Russia’s relatively marginal standing in the current Korean negotiations and proceeds from there to analyze Russia’s interests and stake in a Korean peace process. While in fact Moscow’s standing here is marginal, its interests in peace in Korea and overall in Northeast Asia and in being included in any such process are considerable. The main contribution it can make is in the provision of energy and trade infrastructures such as its longstanding advocacy of a trans-Siberian, trans-Korean railroad and an analogous gas pipeline. We argue that matters have reached a stage where Russia depends on at least one if not both Korean states to allow it into this process and make these kinds of contributions. But beyond the two Korean states, one of the other major participants, i.e. the United States and/or China must also permit such Russian involvement. Yet our reading of their interests strongly suggests that they are opposed to giving Russia precedence over their own interests in Korea. While there are real possibilities for one or both Korean states to invite Moscow into this process, Russia now depends upon “the kindness of strangers” to play the role it wants to have in Korea.