{"title":"The Absurdity Doctrine","authors":"J. Manning","doi":"10.2307/1342768","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory texts when a given application would produce otherwise absurd results. This approach has been an important safety valve in the Court’s case law even during its most textualist phases. The absurdity doctrine is predicated on the idea that Congress enacts legislation against the constraints of limited foresight, resources, and time, and that general language will sometimes produce unanticipated results. The doctrine then assumes that when a statute’s plain meaning produces a result that is contrary to society’s widely shared values, the result must have been unanticipated — something Congress would not have “intended” had it considered the question explicitly. Under that assumption, the Court has been able to avoid apparent statutory oddities without perceiving itself to have violated the constitutional premises of legislative supremacy. This article contends that the insights of modern textualism and public choice theory make that assumption harder to sustain. The legislative process is untidy, and the particular wording of a statute may have been, for unknowable reasons, essential to its passage. Thus, rather than identifying legislative intent, the Court’s invocation of “absurd results” to disturb a clear statutory text, in fact, risks displacing whatever bargain legislators actually reached through the complex and path-dependent legislative process. Moreover, treating the absurdity doctrine, in the alternative, as a normatively justified element of the federal judiciary's law-declaration power not only violates important assumptions underlying our constitutional structure, but also creates an unexplained incongruity between the constitutional assumptions applied in the Court's statutory cases and those applied in constitutional cases involving rationality review. After developing its critique of the absurdity doctrine, the article then considers alternative interpretive doctrines that have enabled the Court to avoid some but not all statutory absurdities.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5000,"publicationDate":"2003-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/1342768","citationCount":"53","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Harvard Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1342768","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 53
Abstract
From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory texts when a given application would produce otherwise absurd results. This approach has been an important safety valve in the Court’s case law even during its most textualist phases. The absurdity doctrine is predicated on the idea that Congress enacts legislation against the constraints of limited foresight, resources, and time, and that general language will sometimes produce unanticipated results. The doctrine then assumes that when a statute’s plain meaning produces a result that is contrary to society’s widely shared values, the result must have been unanticipated — something Congress would not have “intended” had it considered the question explicitly. Under that assumption, the Court has been able to avoid apparent statutory oddities without perceiving itself to have violated the constitutional premises of legislative supremacy. This article contends that the insights of modern textualism and public choice theory make that assumption harder to sustain. The legislative process is untidy, and the particular wording of a statute may have been, for unknowable reasons, essential to its passage. Thus, rather than identifying legislative intent, the Court’s invocation of “absurd results” to disturb a clear statutory text, in fact, risks displacing whatever bargain legislators actually reached through the complex and path-dependent legislative process. Moreover, treating the absurdity doctrine, in the alternative, as a normatively justified element of the federal judiciary's law-declaration power not only violates important assumptions underlying our constitutional structure, but also creates an unexplained incongruity between the constitutional assumptions applied in the Court's statutory cases and those applied in constitutional cases involving rationality review. After developing its critique of the absurdity doctrine, the article then considers alternative interpretive doctrines that have enabled the Court to avoid some but not all statutory absurdities.
期刊介绍:
The Harvard Law Review is a student-run organization whose primary purpose is to publish a journal of legal scholarship. The Review comes out monthly from November through June and has roughly 2,500 pages per volume. The organization is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions and, together with a professional business staff of three, carry out day-to-day operations. Aside from serving as an important academic forum for legal scholarship, the Review has two other goals. First, the journal is designed to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. Second, it provides opportunities for Review members to develop their own editing and writing skills. Accordingly, each issue contains pieces by student editors as well as outside authors. The Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts. All articles — even those by the most respected authorities — are subjected to a rigorous editorial process designed to sharpen and strengthen substance and tone.