The Consideration of Factual Issues in Extradition Habeas

IF 0.2 4区 社会学 Q4 LAW
Artemio Rivera
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The determinations made at an international extradition hearing cannot be appealed and may only be reviewed through habeas corpus. As the case law stands now, habeas courts reviewing extradition decisions are prevented from considering de novo the evidence presented at the extradition hearing, and petitioners are disallowed from introducing evidence to the habeas court. Instead, the factual determinations of the extradition magistrate are reviewed through habeas for “clear error” or through other low level standards of review. The courts support these procedures on authority from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time when the scope of habeas corpus was mostly limited to issues of jurisdiction. I argue that the nature of habeas corpus as an original and independent civil procedure requires that petitioners be allowed to introduce evidence, and demands that habeas courts review de novo the determinations of probable cause by extradition magistrates, rather than through low level standards of review such as “clear error,” or “competent evidence.” These arguments are grounded on three main legal bases: (1) the Court’s opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, which concludes that habeas protection must be greater when the petitioner receives little process in the previous proceeding; (2) the provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2243 that habeas courts must hear and determine the facts anew; and (3) the long history of fact finding by habeas courts when reviewing cases of executive detention and detention without trial.
引渡人身保护中的事实问题思考
在国际引渡听证会上作出的决定不得上诉,只能通过人身保护令加以审查。根据目前的判例法,审查引渡决定的人身保护法院被禁止重新考虑引渡听证会上提出的证据,请愿人也被禁止向人身保护法院提交证据。相反,通过人身保护令或其他低水平的审查标准来审查引渡法官的事实决定,以确定“明显错误”。从19世纪末到20世纪初,法院根据权威支持这些程序,当时人身保护令的范围主要限于管辖权问题。我认为,人身保护令作为一种原始和独立的民事诉讼程序的性质要求允许请愿人提出证据,并要求人身保护令法院重新审查引渡地方法官对可能原因的决定,而不是通过低水平的审查标准,如“明显错误”或“合格证据”。这些论点基于三个主要的法律依据:(1)最高法院在Boumediene诉Bush案中的意见,其结论是,当上诉人在先前的程序中获得的程序很少时,人身保护必须得到更大的保护;(2)《美国法典》第28编第2243条关于人身保护法院必须重新审理和裁定事实的规定;(3)人身保护法院在审查行政拘留和未经审判的拘留案件时进行事实认定的悠久历史。
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来源期刊
自引率
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发文量
35
期刊介绍: The University of Cincinnati Law Review is a quarterly publication produced by second and third-year law students. The Review, along with its counterparts at all other accredited law schools, makes a significant contribution to scholarly legal literature. In addition, the Review represents the College of Law to the outside community. Each year, approximately 30 students are invited to join the Law Review as Associate Members. All Associate Members are chosen on the basis of first year grade point average combined with a writing competition score. The competition begins immediately after completion of first year studies.
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