The Costs of Regulatory Redundancy: Consumer Protection Oversight of Online Travel Agents and the Advantages of Sole FTC Jurisdiction

James C. Cooper
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Every administration in recent history has attempted to reduce regulatory redundancies. One area of regulatory redundancy that deserves attention is the FTC’s and Department of Transportation’s (DOT) consumer protection authority over online travel agents (OTAs), which generated $111 billion in revenue last in 2013. This regulatory redundancy guarantees that two agencies will oversee OTAs, prevents harmonization of online consumer protection policy, and is likely to impose unnecessary costs on OTAs to adhere to two separate regulatory regimes. The importance of this conflict will grow as privacy and data security become preeminent consumer protection issues and DOT expands its jurisdiction to online information providers. Efficiency suggests the FTC as the sole consumer protection overseer of OTAs. Only the FTC has the current capacity to regulate all OTA activities, and it enjoys unrivaled expertise with respect to e-commerce consumer protection. Further, in contrast with FTC’s ex post enforcement approach, which focuses on actual or likely consumer harm, DOT’s ex ante regulatory approach is ill-suited for the fast moving world of e-commerce. Finally, the FTC faces more serious internal and external constraints on its enforcement authority, which tends to temper the potential for regulatory overreach. There are several possible ways to effect this regulatory reform, ranging from the complete abolition of DOT’s aviation consumer protection authority and the FTC Act’s common carrier exemption, to a memorandum of understanding between FTC and DOT that harmonizes policy.
监管冗余的成本:在线旅行社的消费者保护监督和联邦贸易委员会单独管辖的优势
近代历史上的每一届政府都试图减少监管冗余。监管冗余的一个领域值得关注的是美国联邦贸易委员会和美国交通部(DOT)对在线旅行社(ota)的消费者保护权力,后者在2013年创造了1110亿美元的收入。这种监管冗余保证了两个机构将监督在线旅行社,阻止了在线消费者保护政策的协调,并可能给在线旅行社施加不必要的成本,以遵守两个独立的监管制度。随着隐私和数据安全成为重要的消费者保护问题,以及DOT将其管辖范围扩大到在线信息提供商,这种冲突的重要性将会增加。效率表明联邦贸易委员会是在线旅行社唯一的消费者保护监督者。目前只有联邦贸易委员会有能力监管所有在线旅行社活动,它在电子商务消费者保护方面拥有无与伦比的专业知识。此外,与联邦贸易委员会的事后执法方法相反,该方法侧重于实际或可能的消费者伤害,DOT的事前监管方法不适合快速发展的电子商务世界。最后,联邦贸易委员会的执法权力面临更严重的内部和外部限制,这往往会缓和监管越权的可能性。有几种可能的方法来实现这一监管改革,从完全废除交通部的航空消费者保护局和联邦贸易委员会法案的公共承运人豁免,到联邦贸易委员会和DOT之间的谅解备忘录,以协调政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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