Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining

Daniel S. McConkie
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

The vast majority of federal criminal defendants resolve their cases by plea bargaining, with minimal judicial input or oversight. This presents significant issues concerning transparency, fairness, and effective sentencing. Federal prosecutors strongly influence sentences by the charges they select. The parties bargain informally outside of court and strike a deal. But defendants often plead guilty without a realistic understanding of their likely sentencing exposure. Instead, they plead guilty based on their best guess as to how judges will resolve certain issues and their own fear that they could get an unspecified but severe post-trial sentence. The judge is often reluctant to reject the parties’ deal, partly because the judge may have little information about the case, and partly because the judge lacks the resources for courtroom-clogging jury trials. What is needed is a public, court-supervised, advocacy procedure early in the case to guide the parties in considering key sentencing issues and fashioning a just and reasonable sentence based on the judge’s feedback. This article explores a proposed procedure that would do just that. Early in the case, and upon the defendant’s request, the parties would litigate a pre-plea motion procedure similar to sentencing proceedings. As part of those proceedings, a pre-plea, presentence report would be prepared with input from the parties. The motion would educate the judge about the case and enable the judge to issue two indicated sentences: one for if the defendant pleaded guilty as charged, and another for if the defendant were convicted at trial. This increased judicial participation through a regularized, advocacy procedure would allow judges to help frame the parties’ discussion of sentencing issues and likely sentencing consequences earlier in the case, all without involving the judge in the parties’ plea discussions. Several benefits would flow from this: the plea bargaining process would become more transparent, resulting in increased public accountability; the defense attorney would have greater incentives to properly investigate and present key issues; and the defendant could make a more informed decision about whether and on what terms to plead guilty. In short, plea bargaining is here to stay, but criminal justice would be greatly improved by bringing more of the plea bargaining process back into the courtroom where the judge could help frame the key issues for the parties.
法官作为辩诉交易的制定者
绝大多数联邦刑事被告通过辩诉交易解决案件,很少有司法介入或监督。这就提出了有关透明度、公平性和有效量刑的重要问题。联邦检察官通过他们选择的指控对判决有很大影响。双方在法庭外进行非正式谈判并达成协议。但是,被告在认罪时,往往对自己可能面临的量刑风险没有现实的了解。相反,他们认罪是基于他们对法官将如何解决某些问题的最佳猜测,以及他们自己担心自己可能会得到一个不明确但严厉的审判后判决。法官通常不愿意拒绝当事人的协议,部分原因是法官可能对案件知之甚少,部分原因是法官缺乏法庭上陪审团审判的资源。我们需要的是在案件早期建立一个公开的、法院监督的辩护程序,以指导当事人考虑关键的量刑问题,并根据法官的反馈做出公正合理的判决。本文探讨了一个可以做到这一点的拟议过程。在案件早期,根据被告的请求,双方将提起类似于量刑程序的认罪前动议程序。作为这些程序的一部分,将根据当事各方的投入编写一份抗辩前出庭报告。该动议将使法官了解案件,并使法官能够发布两项明确的判决:一项是如果被告认罪,另一项是如果被告在审判中被定罪。这种通过正规化的辩护程序增加的司法参与,将使法官能够在案件早期帮助制定当事人对量刑问题和可能的量刑后果的讨论,而无需让法官参与当事人的辩诉讨论。这将带来几个好处:辩诉交易过程将变得更加透明,从而增加公共问责制;辩护律师会有更大的动机去正确调查和提出关键问题;被告可以更明智地决定是否认罪以及以什么条件认罪。简而言之,辩诉交易将继续存在,但如果将更多的辩诉交易过程带回法庭,法官可以帮助各方制定关键问题,刑事司法将得到极大改善。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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