Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding

Matthew Steilen
{"title":"Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding","authors":"Matthew Steilen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2403956","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this same period the historical record contains hundreds of discussions of judicial review. The Article then advances an explanation of why there was considerable support for judicial review but none for non-enforcement. Judicial review followed from what that generation called “expounding” the law, which meant explaining it. A court was supposed to explain the law in the course of deciding a case. Explaining the law involved examining all potentially relevant legal rules and showing how they fit together to deductively justify the judgment reached. In that context, if a statute could not be reconciled with the constitution, it would not be given effect. Since the president neither decided cases nor expounded the law, he did not enjoy a power of non-enforcement parallel to the power of judicial review.","PeriodicalId":90761,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law","volume":"17 1","pages":"479-568"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Pennsylvania journal of constitutional law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2403956","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this same period the historical record contains hundreds of discussions of judicial review. The Article then advances an explanation of why there was considerable support for judicial review but none for non-enforcement. Judicial review followed from what that generation called “expounding” the law, which meant explaining it. A court was supposed to explain the law in the course of deciding a case. Explaining the law involved examining all potentially relevant legal rules and showing how they fit together to deductively justify the judgment reached. In that context, if a statute could not be reconciled with the constitution, it would not be given effect. Since the president neither decided cases nor expounded the law, he did not enjoy a power of non-enforcement parallel to the power of judicial review.
建国时的司法审查和非强制执行
本文考察了司法审查与总统不执行成文法之间的关系。不强制执行的捍卫者经常辩称,在建国之时盛行的司法审查理由,也为总统拒绝执行违宪法律提供了理由。这个论点站不住脚。这篇文章表明,从宪法批准到宪法生效的第一个十年,基本上没有历史证据支持非强制执行权。它还表明,制宪者一再发表与总统可以拒绝执行他认为违宪的法律的假设不一致的言论。相比之下,在同一时期的历史记录中有数百次关于司法审查的讨论。然后,文章提出了一个解释,为什么对司法审查有相当大的支持,而对非执行没有支持。司法审查是从那一代人所谓的“阐述”法律开始的,意思是解释法律。法院应该在裁决案件的过程中解释法律。解释法律包括审查所有可能相关的法律规则,并展示它们如何结合在一起,演绎出判决的正当性。在这种情况下,如果一项成文法不能与宪法相协调,它就不能生效。由于总统既不裁决案件,也不阐述法律,他不享有与司法审查权力平行的非执行权。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信