Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
Daniel E. Ho, Erica Ross
{"title":"Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006","authors":"Daniel E. Ho, Erica Ross","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1393566","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While the standing doctrine is one of the most widely theorized and criticized doctrines in U.S. law, its origins remain controversial. One revisionist view espouses that New Deal progressive justices purposely invented the standing doctrine to insulate administrative agencies from judicial review. Yet existing support for this “insulation thesis” is weak. Our Article provides the first systematic empirical evidence of the historical evolution of standing. We synthesize the theory and claims underlying the insulation thesis and compile a new database of every standing issue decided, along with all contested merits votes, by the Supreme Court from 1921-2006. To overcome conventional problems of haphazard case selection, we amass, read, and classify over 1,500 cases cited in historical treatments of the doctrine, assembling a database of all standing issues contested. With modern statistical methods and this new dataset – comprised of 47,570 votes for 5,497 unique issues and 229 standing issues – we find compelling evidence for the insulation thesis. Before 1940, progressive justices disproportionately deny standing to plaintiffs in cases that largely involve challenges to administrative agencies. After 1940, the political valence of the standing doctrine reverses: progressives uniformly favor standing. Justices Douglas and Black, in particular, track this evolution (and valence reversal) of the standing doctrine. Our results challenge legal inquiries of what claims are traditionally amenable to judicial resolution and highlight the unintended consequences of judicial innovation.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"62 1","pages":"591"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9000,"publicationDate":"2009-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Stanford Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1393566","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18

Abstract

While the standing doctrine is one of the most widely theorized and criticized doctrines in U.S. law, its origins remain controversial. One revisionist view espouses that New Deal progressive justices purposely invented the standing doctrine to insulate administrative agencies from judicial review. Yet existing support for this “insulation thesis” is weak. Our Article provides the first systematic empirical evidence of the historical evolution of standing. We synthesize the theory and claims underlying the insulation thesis and compile a new database of every standing issue decided, along with all contested merits votes, by the Supreme Court from 1921-2006. To overcome conventional problems of haphazard case selection, we amass, read, and classify over 1,500 cases cited in historical treatments of the doctrine, assembling a database of all standing issues contested. With modern statistical methods and this new dataset – comprised of 47,570 votes for 5,497 unique issues and 229 standing issues – we find compelling evidence for the insulation thesis. Before 1940, progressive justices disproportionately deny standing to plaintiffs in cases that largely involve challenges to administrative agencies. After 1940, the political valence of the standing doctrine reverses: progressives uniformly favor standing. Justices Douglas and Black, in particular, track this evolution (and valence reversal) of the standing doctrine. Our results challenge legal inquiries of what claims are traditionally amenable to judicial resolution and highlight the unintended consequences of judicial innovation.
是自由派大法官发明了常设原则吗?1921-2006年中国银行存续权演变的实证研究
虽然常备原则是美国法律中理论化程度最高、受到批评最多的原则之一,但其起源仍存在争议。一种修正主义观点认为,新政的进步大法官故意发明了常备原则,以使行政机构免受司法审查。然而,对这种“绝缘理论”的现有支持是薄弱的。我们的文章提供了第一个系统的经验证据的历史演变的立场。我们综合了隔离理论的理论和主张,并编制了一个新的数据库,其中包含了最高法院从1921年到2006年所决定的每一个常设问题,以及所有有争议的案情投票。为了克服随意选择案例的传统问题,我们收集、阅读并分类了1500多个在教义的历史处理中引用的案例,组装了一个所有有争议的常设问题的数据库。通过现代统计方法和这个新的数据集——由5497个独特问题和229个常设问题的47,570张选票组成——我们为绝缘论文找到了令人信服的证据。在1940年之前,在主要涉及挑战行政机构的案件中,进步派法官不成比例地否认原告的诉讼资格。1940年之后,立场主义的政治价值发生了逆转:进步人士一致支持立场。道格拉斯法官和布莱克法官,尤其关注常设原则的这种演变(和效价逆转)。我们的研究结果挑战了传统上适用于司法解决的索赔的法律调查,并突出了司法创新的意外后果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Information not localized
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信