The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight

IF 2.3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Stephen M. Bainbridge, S. Lopez, Benjamin Oklan
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), two important strands of Delaware corporate law converged; namely, the concept of good faith and the duty of directors to monitor the corporation's employees for law compliance. As to the former, Stone puts to rest any remaining question as to whether acting in bad faith is an independent basis of liability under Delaware corporate law, stating that although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a 'triad' of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly. 911 A.2d at 370. Nevertheless, this holding may not matter much, because the Stone court makes clear that acts taken in bad faith breach the duty of loyalty. As a result, instead of being split out as a separate fiduciary duty, good faith has been subsumed by loyalty. In this sense, Stone looks like a compromise between those scholars and jurists who wanted to elevate good faith to being part of a triad of fiduciary duties and those who did not, with the former losing as a matter of form, and the latter losing as a matter of substance. As to the duty of oversight, Stone confirmed former Chancellor William Allen's dicta in Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), that the fiduciary duty of care of corporate directors includes an obligation for directors to take some affirmative law compliance measures. In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions for assessing director oversight liability. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365. This article argues that the convergence of good faith and oversight is one of those unfortunate marriages that leaves both sides worse off. New and unnecessary doctrinal uncertainties have been created. This article identifies those uncertainties and suggests how they should be resolved.
诚信与监督的融合
在Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)中,特拉华州公司法的两个重要分支融合在一起;即诚信的概念和董事监督公司员工守法的责任。对于前者,斯通提出了关于恶意行为是否构成特拉华州公司法下的独立责任基础的任何剩余问题,他指出,尽管善意可以被口头描述为包括谨慎义务和忠诚义务在内的“三位一体”信义义务的一部分,但善意行为的义务并没有建立起与谨慎义务和忠诚义务相同的独立信义义务。只有违反后两项义务才可能直接导致责任,而不诚实信用行为则可能间接导致责任。911, 2d, 370。然而,这一判决可能并不重要,因为斯通法院明确表示,恶意行为违反了忠诚义务。因此,诚信不再作为一项独立的信义义务被分离出来,而是被忠诚所包含。从这个意义上说,斯通看起来像是学者和法学家之间的一种妥协,前者在形式上失败,后者在实质上失败。那些学者和法学家希望将诚信提升为信托义务的一部分,而另一些人则不这样做。至于监督的责任,斯通证实了前财政大臣威廉·艾伦在Caremark国际公司的言论。引出。Litig。, 698 A.2d 959Ch. 1996)认为,公司董事的信义注意义务包括董事有义务采取一些积极的法律合规措施。在斯通案中,特拉华州最高法院确认,Caremark明确规定了评估董事监督责任的必要条件。斯通,911,2d, 365。本文认为,诚信与监管的融合是一种不幸的婚姻,它会让双方都变得更糟。新的和不必要的教义不确定性已经产生。本文确定了这些不确定性,并建议如何解决它们。
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来源期刊
Ucla Law Review
Ucla Law Review Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
4.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: In 1953, Chief Justice Earl Warren welcomed the UCLA Law Review''s founding volume by stating that, “[t]o a judge, whose decisions provide grist for the law review mill, the review may be both a severe critique and a helpful guide.” The UCLA Law Review seeks to publish the highest quality legal scholarship written by professors, aspiring academics, and students. In doing so, we strive to provide an environment in which UCLA Law Review students may grow as legal writers and thinkers. Founded in December 1953, the UCLA Law Review publishes six times per year by students of the UCLA School of Law and the Regents of the University of California. We also publish material solely for online consumption and dialogue in Discourse, and we produce podcasts in Dialectic.
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