The Defenseless Marriage Act: The Legitimacy of President Obama's Refusal to Defend DOMA § 3

S. Pepper
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

This article examines whether a President’s refusal to defend a law against constitutional challenge in court is: (1) constitutional and (2) normatively desirable. I answer both questions negatively.With respect to the constitutional question, I evaluate the assumptions necessary for a President to take action against an unconstitutional law, namely that he has the right to interpret the Constitution and the right to act on those interpretations in some form. The thrust of my article focuses on whether the means by which a President confronts an unconstitutional law are discretionary such that he may refuse to defend a law without also refusing to enforce it.I conclude that a President may not refuse to defend a law without also suspending it. Upon further analysis, I conclude that when a President suspends a law, he precludes the Court's review of its constitutionality altogether (at least under our existing conceptions of standing and justiciability), so, in effect, declining to defend a law does not exist as a legitimate, constitutional means of presidential action against an unconstitutional law.I also shed some light on the previously unexamined question of whether declining to defend a law is normatively desirable. The strongest argument supporting declining to defend the law is that, as opposed to outright suspension of a law, declining to defend only demonstrates much greater deference to the other branches of government (i.e., Congress may step in to defend the law if it chooses, and continuing to enforce the law facilitates a case or controversy such that a court may hear the case on its merits). I conclude, however, that this deference is a fiction: The President only facilitates a case or controversy if Congress steps in to defend the law in question. Furthermore, the fact that Congress is willing to do so is not a benign acceptance of the Executive’s invitation, but an inevitable response to what is, unquestionably, an attack upon it and its laws. Declining only to defend a law allows the President to attack the other branches of government without incurring the checks and balances that should accompany such action and to obscure accountability for his constitutional interpretations. Short of a willingness to suspend the law and endure the political consequences, the law deserves the Executive Branch's defense.
《无防备婚姻法:奥巴马总统拒绝捍卫婚姻保护法第3条的合法性》
本文探讨了总统拒绝在法庭上为一项法律辩护以应对宪法挑战是否符合:(1)符合宪法;(2)符合规范。我否定地回答了这两个问题。关于宪法问题,我评估了总统对违宪法律采取行动所必需的假设,即他有权解释宪法,并有权以某种形式根据这些解释采取行动。我这篇文章的重点是总统面对违宪法律的手段是否可以自由裁量,以至于他可以拒绝为法律辩护,同时也拒绝执行法律。我的结论是,总统在不中止法律的情况下,不得拒绝为法律辩护。经过进一步分析,我得出的结论是,当总统暂停一项法律时,他完全排除了法院对其合宪性的审查(至少根据我们现有的立场和可诉性概念),因此,实际上,拒绝为法律辩护并不作为总统反对违宪法律的合法、合宪性手段而存在。我还阐明了先前未被研究的问题,即拒绝为法律辩护在规范上是否可取。支持拒绝为法律辩护的最有力的论据是,与彻底中止一项法律相比,拒绝为法律辩护只表明对政府其他部门的更大尊重(即,国会可以选择介入为法律辩护,继续执行法律有助于案件或争议,以便法院可以根据案情审理案件)。然而,我的结论是,这种尊重是一种虚构:只有在国会介入捍卫相关法律的情况下,总统才会促成案件或争议。此外,国会愿意这样做的事实并不是对行政部门邀请的善意接受,而是对毫无疑问是对它及其法律的攻击的必然回应。仅仅拒绝为一项法律辩护,就允许总统攻击政府的其他部门,而不会招致这种行动应有的制衡,也不会模糊他对宪法解释的责任。如果不愿意暂停这项法律并忍受政治后果,这项法律应该得到行政部门的辩护。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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