Whatever Floats the 'Reasonable Observer's' Boat: An Examination of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida and the Supreme Court's Ruling that Floating Homes Are Not Vessels
{"title":"Whatever Floats the 'Reasonable Observer's' Boat: An Examination of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida and the Supreme Court's Ruling that Floating Homes Are Not Vessels","authors":"Kathryn D. Yankowski","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2264866","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Local and state legislatures have taken active steps in developing a workable code of laws and regulations that apply specifically to floating homes. However, because these homes are on top of navigable waters and are physically capable of being towed across the high seas, there was a valid argument that such structures fall under maritime law and are therefore governed by federal admiralty statutes. The term “vessel” is defined in Section 3 of the U.S. Code as “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” This definition is the threshold question that courts must answer before applying any federal law affecting vessels to a particular watercraft. The case law that developed since Section 3’s enactment has helped refine that broad definition into a more useable standard. This Note provides a comprehensive overview of Section 3’s place in admiralty law, from its codification in the late nineteenth century, throughout its evolution over the generations, leading to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., where it held that floating homes are not “vessels” as contemplated by federal statutes. Section II of this Note begins by introducing the parties and establishing the history involved in Lozman, a case that decided the question of whether a Florida resident’s floating home was a vessel subject to admiralty laws and federal jurisdiction. Historical case law and subsequent evaluations of maritime precedent, upon which both the Lozman Court and the parties relied, is detailed in Section III. This Note dissects the Lozman opinion in Section IV, discussing the Court’s reasoning for why it held that the floating home was not a “vessel” for jurisdictional purposes under Section 3. Section V then provides an analysis of the decision, examining the way the Court utilized precedent and incorporated traditional admiralty law tests. Lastly, Section VI lays out various policy concerns existing in the underpinnings of admiralty and property law that point in favor of the Supreme Court’s decision to exclude floating homes from federal regulation.","PeriodicalId":83419,"journal":{"name":"University of Miami law review","volume":"67 1","pages":"975"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Miami law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2264866","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Local and state legislatures have taken active steps in developing a workable code of laws and regulations that apply specifically to floating homes. However, because these homes are on top of navigable waters and are physically capable of being towed across the high seas, there was a valid argument that such structures fall under maritime law and are therefore governed by federal admiralty statutes. The term “vessel” is defined in Section 3 of the U.S. Code as “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” This definition is the threshold question that courts must answer before applying any federal law affecting vessels to a particular watercraft. The case law that developed since Section 3’s enactment has helped refine that broad definition into a more useable standard. This Note provides a comprehensive overview of Section 3’s place in admiralty law, from its codification in the late nineteenth century, throughout its evolution over the generations, leading to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., where it held that floating homes are not “vessels” as contemplated by federal statutes. Section II of this Note begins by introducing the parties and establishing the history involved in Lozman, a case that decided the question of whether a Florida resident’s floating home was a vessel subject to admiralty laws and federal jurisdiction. Historical case law and subsequent evaluations of maritime precedent, upon which both the Lozman Court and the parties relied, is detailed in Section III. This Note dissects the Lozman opinion in Section IV, discussing the Court’s reasoning for why it held that the floating home was not a “vessel” for jurisdictional purposes under Section 3. Section V then provides an analysis of the decision, examining the way the Court utilized precedent and incorporated traditional admiralty law tests. Lastly, Section VI lays out various policy concerns existing in the underpinnings of admiralty and property law that point in favor of the Supreme Court’s decision to exclude floating homes from federal regulation.
地方和州立法机构已采取积极步骤,制订专门适用于流动住房的切实可行的法律法规。然而,由于这些房屋位于通航水域之上,并且在物理上能够被拖过公海,因此有一个有效的论点认为,这些结构属于海事法,因此受联邦海事法规管辖。《美国法典》第3条对“船舶”一词的定义是:“对用作或能够用作水上运输工具的船舶或其他人工装置的任何描述。”这一定义是法院在将任何影响船舶的联邦法律适用于特定船舶之前必须回答的门槛问题。自第3条颁布以来发展起来的判例法有助于将这一宽泛的定义细化为更可用的标准。本文全面概述了第3条在海商法中的地位,从19世纪末的编纂,到几代人的演变,最后到最高法院2013年对佛罗里达州里维埃拉海滩市(Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach)一案的裁决。在该案中,最高法院认为,漂浮房屋不是联邦法规所设想的“船只”。本说明的第二部分首先介绍了Lozman案的当事人和历史,该案件决定了佛罗里达州居民的浮动房屋是否属于海事法和联邦管辖范围内的船只。Lozman法院和当事各方所依据的历史判例法和随后的海事判例评估详见第三节。本说明在第四节剖析Lozman一案的意见,讨论法院为何根据第三节裁定浮动住宅不是出于管辖权目的的“船只”的理由。然后,第五节对判决进行了分析,审查了法院利用先例和纳入传统海事法检验标准的方式。最后,第六节列出了海事法和财产法基础中存在的各种政策问题,这些问题都支持最高法院将浮动房屋排除在联邦监管之外的决定。