{"title":"Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns? A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court","authors":"E. A. Young, Erin C. Blondel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2209941","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper responds to an article by Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt showing that Supreme Court justices tend to decide cases in favor of the government more often during economic upswings, decide cases against the government more often during economic downturns, and again favor the government during severe economic crises. Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt conclude that these data prove that the justices deliberately vote to influence economic policy. Our paper questions that logical leap. We argue that although these data strongly suggest that the economic environment influences judicial decisions, there is no proof that justices intentionally decide cases to shape the economy rather than based on the law. We suggest that although empirical studies of judicial decision-making -- such as the study by Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt -- provide valuable insight that doctrinal analysis cannot supply, scholars should avoid overstating what those studies prove. Many such scholars seek not to understand what external factors shape judges but to debunk legal decisionmaking and prove that it is merely a cover for political action. That conclusion has much less support in data and overlooks the real possibility that legal doctrine truly does shape judicial decisions too.","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"58 1","pages":"1759-1782"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2013-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2209941","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2209941","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
This paper responds to an article by Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt showing that Supreme Court justices tend to decide cases in favor of the government more often during economic upswings, decide cases against the government more often during economic downturns, and again favor the government during severe economic crises. Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt conclude that these data prove that the justices deliberately vote to influence economic policy. Our paper questions that logical leap. We argue that although these data strongly suggest that the economic environment influences judicial decisions, there is no proof that justices intentionally decide cases to shape the economy rather than based on the law. We suggest that although empirical studies of judicial decision-making -- such as the study by Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt -- provide valuable insight that doctrinal analysis cannot supply, scholars should avoid overstating what those studies prove. Many such scholars seek not to understand what external factors shape judges but to debunk legal decisionmaking and prove that it is merely a cover for political action. That conclusion has much less support in data and overlooks the real possibility that legal doctrine truly does shape judicial decisions too.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.