Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?

Abstract

The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.