Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy

Frederick Tung
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Treatment of contingent tort liabilities when a business is sold presents a particular challenge for corporate and bankruptcy law. In this article, I focus on the precarious position of future tort claimants-those who may be harmed by a manufacturer's defective product after the manufacturer has sold its business and disappeared. By the time the future claimant's injury occurs, she may be left with no means of recovery. While the article focuses primarily on the bankruptcy sale context, a discussion of the nonbankruptcy context provides important background. With respect to the nonbankruptcy context, I discuss the doctrine of successor liability and the controversy concerning its various proffered rationales. I conclude tentatively that a cost internalization approach is the most plausible. One consequence of a cost internalization approach is that its applicability in the insolvency context is questionable. If the manufacturer is insolvent at the time of sale, then any acquirer should take free of successor liability risk. Insolvency means that the manufacturer's equity capital has already been exhausted at the time of sale. Therefore, any costs shifted by virtue of the acquirer's discounted bid price would simply be shifted from one set of the manufacturer's creditors to another. While there is good reason to prefer future claimants over the manufacturer's shareholders-which under a cost internalization theory is the effect of successor liability if he manufacturer is solvent-there may not be good reason to prefer future claimants over other creditors of the manufacturer. This observation, coupled with the transaction costs that successor liability creates, suggests that the doctrine should not apply in the insolvency context. In the bankruptcy sale context, proper treatment of future claims and any attendant successor liability rights is also an unsettled question.I argue (1) that future claims should always be accounted for in the bankruptcy proceeding in which a business is transferred, and (2) that once that is accomplished, attendant successor liability rights may properly be eliminated. Inclusion of future claimants in bankruptcy's common pool is necessary in order to provide complete relief to the debtor and assure survival of the going concern. It also vindicates bankruptcy's norm of equal treatment. Provided future claims are included in the bankruptcy distribution, that should be their exclusive remedy. They do not deserve a second recovery that post-bankruptcy successor liability would provide. Neither of these prescriptions, however, is a given under current law.In the mass tort context, future claims are included in bankruptcy because they must be in order for the business to survive, but otherwise they are ignored. Recent reform proposals seem to condone such inconsistent, result-oriented treatment of future claims in bankruptcy, as theorists call for a "flexible" approach. I argue that in the bankruptcy sale context, a flexible approach merely enables exploitation of future claimants. Much like the situation outside of bankruptcy, a flexible approach enables other parties to leave losses with future claimants if that strategy will maximize returns to those other parties. With respect to disposition of successor liability claims following bankruptcy, the courts are in disarray. That future claims are ordinarily ignored in bankruptcy has caused certain courts to proclaim that future claimants' successor liability rights may never be affected by bankruptcy. I suggest that this view stems from a misapprehension concerning the proper rationale for successor liability. From a cost internalization perspective, it becomes clear that as long as future claims are accounted for in bankruptcy, successor liability rights should not survive. Finally, I discuss implementation of mandatory inclusion of future claims in the bankruptcy sale context. I propose a low cost alternative to the mass tort model, which I refer to as Commensurate Discounted Assumption.
认真对待未来债权:破产中的未来债权和继承人责任
当企业被出售时,处理或有侵权责任对公司法和破产法提出了一个特别的挑战。在这篇文章中,我将重点关注未来侵权索赔人的不稳定地位——在制造商出售其业务并消失后,那些可能受到制造商缺陷产品伤害的人。当未来的索赔人受伤时,她可能没有任何恢复的手段。虽然本文主要关注破产出售情境,但对非破产情境的讨论提供了重要的背景。关于非破产的背景,我讨论了继承人责任的原则和关于其各种提供的理由的争议。我暂时得出结论,成本内部化方法是最合理的。成本内部化办法的一个后果是,它在破产情况下的适用性值得怀疑。如果制造商在出售时资不抵债,那么任何收购者都不应承担继承责任风险。资不抵债意味着制造商的权益资本在出售时已经耗尽。因此,由于收购方的折扣投标价格而转移的任何成本,只会从一组制造商的债权人转移到另一组债权人。虽然有充分的理由优先考虑未来的索赔人,而不是制造商的股东——根据成本内部化理论,如果制造商有偿付能力,这是继承人责任的影响——但可能没有充分的理由优先考虑未来的索赔人,而不是制造商的其他债权人。这一观察结果,再加上继承责任造成的交易成本,表明该原则不应适用于破产情况。在破产出售的背景下,对未来债权和随之而来的继承人责任权利的适当处理也是一个悬而未决的问题。我认为(1)在企业转让的破产程序中,未来的债权应该总是被考虑在内,(2)一旦完成,随之而来的继承人责任权利可以适当地消除。为了向债务人提供完全的救济并确保持续经营的生存,将未来的索赔人纳入破产共同池是必要的。这也证明了平等对待破产的准则是正确的。如果未来的债权包括在破产分配中,这应该是他们的排他性救济。他们不应该得到破产后的继任者责任所提供的第二次复苏。然而,这两种规定都不是现行法律规定的。在大规模侵权行为的背景下,未来的索赔被包括在破产中,因为它们必须是为了企业生存,否则它们就被忽略了。最近的改革提案似乎宽恕了这种不一致的、以结果为导向的未来破产索赔处理方式,理论家们呼吁采取一种“灵活”的方式。我认为,在破产出售的背景下,灵活的方法只会使未来的索赔人受到剥削。就像破产之外的情况一样,灵活的方法使其他各方能够将损失留给未来的索赔人,如果这种策略能使其他各方的回报最大化的话。对于破产后继承人责任的处理,法院是一片混乱。未来的债权通常在破产中被忽视,这导致某些法院宣布,未来债权人的继承责任权利可能永远不会受到破产的影响。我认为,这种观点源于对继承人责任的适当理由的误解。从成本内部化的角度来看,很明显,只要未来的债权被计入破产,继承责任权利就不应该存在。最后,我讨论了在破产出售背景下强制纳入未来债权的实施。我提出了一个替代大规模侵权模式的低成本方案,我称之为相称折现假设。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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