The Illusion of Interchangeability: The Benefits and Dangers of Guidance-Plus Rulemaking in the FDA's Biosimilar Approval Process

2区 法学 Q1 Social Sciences
Jonathan R. K. Stroud
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the ambitious Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. While media attention focused largely on the sweeping changes the bill makes to the nation’s healthcare system, there was also a less-noticed rider to the bill, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (Biosimilars Act). The Biosimilars Act grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) broad new authority to create an accelerated premarket approval pathway for generic competition to biologics in an attempt to drive biologic drug prices down and reduce the overall costs of health care.Traditionally, inventors of medical products such as drugs and devices obtain patent protection at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for a twenty-year exclusive term and simultaneously must seek FDA approval to market their invention and for a trademark for their brand name.Because of the complicated and thorough approval process the FDA conducts, it is often expensive and time-consuming for the initial innovator to bring a drug to market. Likewise, it is often prohibitively expensive for a generic follow-on company to bring an analogue to market, after patent protection has expired, through duplicative and costly reapproval of the innovator drug, and it would be unethical to subject further human subjects to unneeded clinical trials.To deal with these problems, in 1984 Congress enacted a law called the Price, Competition, and Patent Term Restoration Act, which is commonly referred to as the Hatch–Waxman Act. The Act allows generic follow-on drugs to seek accelerated approval by the FDA. In exchange, the law grants limited data exclusivity — and hence, often de facto market exclusivity — for the original brand-name innovator. The Act utilizes a preexisting compilation of all relevant drugs and their clinical indications, the Orange Book, to list generic analogues. Most importantly, Hatch–Waxman allows generic drug manufacturers to use the same FDA approval data as the brand-name manufacturers had in an abbreviated approval application (thus eliminating the need for duplicative human trials and reducing cost for generic manufacturers). The result has been a decrease in the cost of prescription drugs due to increased price competition after the expiration of the original drug’s patent term.By formulating the Hatch–Waxman Act broadly, Congress has given the FDA wide flexibility to regulate. It has mandated the use of guidance documents, a less costly and time-consuming form of regulating than formal or even informal rulemaking. This guidance mandate has the advantage of increased flexibility and a faster turnaround time than traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Nevertheless, if the FDA does not use that flexibility judiciously, the Biosimilars Act may not achieve actual reductions in the cost of prescription biological drugs or significantly affect the cost of health care.Part I of this Comment discusses the Hatch–Waxman amendments, analogous foreign biosimilars pathways, and the history of biologics approval. Part II discusses the new bill, compares the Hatch–Waxman pathway with the potential biosimilars pathway, and explores key differences between the two that could delay access to both innovator and generic drugs. Part III recommends using notice-and-comment procedures to establish product-class-specific guidance, while retaining flexibility within product classes for clinical requirements, and discourages the FDA from using two-sided biostatistical testing.
可互换性的错觉:FDA生物仿制药批准过程中指导和规则制定的好处和危险
2010年3月23日,奥巴马总统签署了雄心勃勃的《患者保护和平价医疗法案》。虽然媒体的注意力主要集中在该法案对国家医疗体系的彻底改变上,但该法案还有一个鲜为人知的附加条款,即《2009年生物制品价格竞争与创新法案》(《生物仿制药法案》)。《生物仿制药法案》授予美国食品和药物管理局(FDA)广泛的新权力,为生物制剂的仿制药竞争创造一个加速上市前审批途径,以推动生物药品价格下降,降低医疗保健的总体成本。传统上,医疗产品(如药品和设备)的发明者在美国专利商标局(USPTO)获得为期20年的专利保护,同时必须寻求FDA批准推销其发明并为其品牌名称申请商标。由于FDA的审批过程复杂而彻底,对于最初的创新者来说,将一种药物推向市场往往既昂贵又耗时。同样,仿制药公司在专利保护到期后,通过对创新药物的重复和昂贵的重新批准,将类似物推向市场,往往代价高昂,而且让更多的人体受试者进行不必要的临床试验也是不道德的。为了解决这些问题,国会于1984年颁布了一项名为《价格、竞争和专利期限恢复法案》的法律,该法案通常被称为《哈奇-韦克斯曼法案》。该法案允许仿制后续药物寻求FDA的加速批准。作为交换,该法律授予最初的品牌创新者有限的数据专营权——因此,通常是事实上的市场专营权。该法案利用预先存在的所有相关药物及其临床适应症的汇编,即橙皮书,列出仿制类似物。最重要的是,Hatch-Waxman允许仿制药制造商在简化的批准申请中使用与品牌制造商相同的FDA批准数据(从而消除了重复人体试验的需要并降低了仿制药制造商的成本)。其结果是,由于原药专利期满后价格竞争加剧,处方药的成本下降。通过广泛地制定哈奇-韦克斯曼法案,国会给了FDA很大的监管灵活性。它要求使用指导性文件,这是一种比正式甚至非正式规则制定成本更低、耗时更短的监管形式。与传统的通知-评论规则制定相比,这一指导任务具有更大的灵活性和更快的周转时间。然而,如果FDA不明智地使用这种灵活性,生物仿制药法案可能无法实现处方生物药物成本的实际降低或显著影响医疗保健成本。本评论的第一部分讨论了Hatch-Waxman修正案,类似的国外生物仿制药途径以及生物制剂批准的历史。第二部分讨论了新法案,比较了Hatch-Waxman途径与潜在的生物仿制药途径,并探讨了两者之间可能延迟获得创新药物和仿制药的关键差异。第三部分建议使用通知和评论程序来建立特定于产品类别的指导,同时在产品类别中保留临床要求的灵活性,并不鼓励FDA使用双边生物统计学测试。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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