Whistleblowers and Rogues: The Urgent Call for an Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability

IF 0.2 4区 社会学 Q4 LAW
Marcia Narine Weldon
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Abstract

Courts hold corporations vicariously liable for the criminal acts of their employees even when those employees have acted contrary to established company policies, explicit employer instructions and without management’s knowledge or ratification. The current legal regime places firms in a quandary - do they rectify the wrongdoing internally and hope that a whistleblower does not report them to the authorities, or do they disclose to the government the fact that rogue employees have violated the law thereby subjecting themselves to high financial penalties, the threat of criminal prosecution, loss of shareholder value, civil suits, suspension of private and public contracts and reputational damage? Corporations must comply and contend with Dodd-Frank whistleblower legislation, which rewards tipsters even if they bypass credible, functioning internal compliance programs; the 2010 UK Bribery Act, which imposes strict liability on companies doing business in the U.K; and the twentieth anniversary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines used to sentence corporate defendants. With this changing regulatory landscape, it is time to eliminate the current disincentives to optimal investment in compliance. Many academics and even former justice department officials have called for either the abolition of criminal liability or for an affirmative defense. This article raises the bar and proposes an affirmative defense and a presumption against criminal liability for a compliance program that exceeds the current standards and that would be audited by an objective third party free from conflicts of interest or, in the alternative and preferably, pre-certified by the government itself. This defense would level the playing field between corporations and prosecutors, would provide the proper incentives for companies to prevent, detect and disclose criminal activity, and would allow both the private and public sector to allocate their resources more productively.
举报人与流氓:迫切要求对公司刑事责任进行积极辩护
法院认为公司对其雇员的犯罪行为负有替代责任,即使这些雇员的行为违反了既定的公司政策、雇主的明确指示,而且没有得到管理层的知情或批准。目前的法律制度使公司陷入两难境地——他们是在内部纠正不当行为,希望举报人不会向当局举报他们,还是向政府披露流氓员工违反法律的事实,从而使自己面临高额的经济处罚、刑事起诉的威胁、股东价值的损失、民事诉讼、私人和公共合同的中止以及声誉的损害?企业必须遵守和应对多德-弗兰克(Dodd-Frank)举报人法案,该法案奖励举报人,即使他们绕过了可信的、有效的内部合规计划;2010年通过的《英国反贿赂法》(Bribery Act)对在英国开展业务的公司规定了严格的责任;以及用于判决公司被告的《联邦量刑指南》颁布20周年。随着监管环境的变化,现在是时候消除当前阻碍合规最佳投资的因素了。许多学者,甚至前司法部官员都呼吁要么废除刑事责任,要么进行积极辩护。这篇文章提高了标准,提出了一种肯定的辩护和对超过现行标准的合规计划的刑事责任推定,该计划将由客观的第三方进行审计,没有利益冲突,或者,最好是由政府自己进行预先认证。这种辩护将在公司和检察官之间创造公平的竞争环境,将为公司预防、发现和披露犯罪活动提供适当的激励,并将允许私营和公共部门更有效地分配资源。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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