The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World

M. Leary
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. These protections, therefore, are only triggered when the government engages is a “search” or “seizure.” For decades, the Court defined “search” as a government examination of an area where one has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Such an expectation requires both that the individual demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation is one society finds reasonable. In 1974, Anthony Amsterdam prophesized the unworkability of this test, warning of a day that the government would circumvent it my merely announcing 24 hour surveillance. Similarly, the Court has stated that it would adjust the definition of a search if the government tried to “condition” citizens to have no expectation of privacy. Today, those concerns have come to bear, but not in the way Amsterdam or the Court predicted, and the Court has failed to respond. Today, private commercial entities, not the government, have utilized technology to “condition” citizens to have no expectation of privacy. They have done so on two particular levels. First, these commercial entities have obtained private data about citizens, i.e. information from their “digital dossier.” They have then revealed the information to others resulting in citizens feeling as though “nothing is private.” Second, when these entities obtain the data, they do not afford the individuals the opportunity to “demonstrate” their subjective expectation of privacy. Since a “search” requires a demonstration of a subjective expectation of privacy, and these commercial entities have used today’s technology to strip citizens of any expectation of privacy or ability to demonstrate one, then little the government examines will constitute a “search” and trigger Fourth Amendment protections. This article identifies this assault on the expectation of privacy due to “commercial conditioning” of the consumer and proposes a viable legislative solution. It examines the Court’s existing approaches, including a thorough analysis of the recently articulated frameworks announced in the majority and concurring opinions of United States v. Jones, noting their inadequacy for today’s technological challenges. Utilizing the example of satellite imaging technology, it demonstrates the threat to privacy expectations unanticipated by the Court. This article proposes a new legislative framework for respecting privacy protections in response to these commercial induced privacy affronts. This framework, supported by analogous American law and European proposals, calls for an opt-in model. Before a citizen can be assumed to have voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he must meaningfully opt in to the sharing of his private data. Such an opt-in must not conditioned upon the service but must be uncoerced. This approach advocates for addressing this unanticipated problem further upstream than other solutions by focusing on the commercial entities and not the later police action. It is rooted in the concept of ownership of one’s digital footprint and, therefore, the right to control one’s data.
美国诉琼斯案错失良机:后谷歌地球时代第四修正案保护的商业侵蚀
第四修正案保护人们免受政府不合理的搜查和扣押。因此,这些保护措施只有在政府进行“搜查”或“扣押”时才会被触发。几十年来,最高法院一直将“搜查”定义为政府对个人“合理期望隐私”的领域进行的检查。这种期望既要求个人表现出对隐私的主观期望,又要求这种期望是社会认为合理的。1974年,安东尼·阿姆斯特丹(Anthony Amsterdam)预言了这项测试的不可行性,他警告说,总有一天,只要政府宣布24小时监控,就会绕过这项测试。同样,最高法院表示,如果政府试图“限定”公民不期望享有隐私,它将调整搜查的定义。今天,这些关切成为现实,但不是以阿姆斯特丹或法院所预测的方式,法院没有作出反应。今天,私人商业实体,而不是政府,已经利用技术来“约束”公民,使他们对隐私没有任何期望。他们在两个特定层面上做到了这一点。首先,这些商业实体获取了公民的私人数据,即来自公民“数字档案”的信息。然后,他们将这些信息透露给其他人,导致公民感觉“没有什么是隐私的”。其次,当这些实体获得数据时,他们没有给个人提供机会来“展示”他们对隐私的主观期望。既然“搜索”需要证明对隐私的主观期望,而这些商业实体已经利用今天的技术剥夺了公民对隐私的任何期望或证明隐私的能力,那么政府检查的任何东西都不会构成“搜索”并触发第四修正案的保护。本文指出了由于消费者的“商业条件”而对隐私期望的攻击,并提出了一个可行的立法解决方案。它审查了法院的现有办法,包括对最近在美国诉琼斯案的多数意见和一致意见中宣布的明确框架进行彻底分析,指出它们不足以应付当今的技术挑战。它以卫星成像技术为例,说明了对隐私预期的威胁是最高法院未曾预料到的。本文提出了一种新的尊重隐私保护的立法框架,以应对这些商业引发的隐私侵犯。在类似的美国法律和欧洲提案的支持下,这一框架要求一种选择加入的模式。在一个公民自愿牺牲他的隐私之前,他必须有意义地选择分享他的私人数据。这种选择不应以服务为条件,而必须是非强迫的。这种方法主张通过关注商业实体而不是后期的警察行动,比其他解决方案更上游地解决这一意想不到的问题。它根植于个人数字足迹所有权的概念,因此也就是控制个人数据的权利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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