{"title":"Democracy, Violence, and Constitutional Revision in the Shadow of Democratic Revolution Theory","authors":"Tuan N. Samahon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1968424","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This response essay identified two objections to Richard Albert’s paper Democratic Revolution and his theory of democratic revolution. First, it observes that democracy is but one desirable aspect of governance and its overemphasis is in considerable tension with the protection of minority interests and the consensus-seeking features of constitutionalism. Second, contrary to Albert's claim, violence and its threat often do attend revolution - whether or not violence or its threat is a defining characteristic of revolution. In light of the undesirability of crass majoritarianism and revolutionary violence, this essay considers whether Albert’s theory could be accommodated either by interpretation-as-amendment or by the Article V method for amending the document. The response concludes that neither would suffice to satisfy the demands of Albert’s democratic revolutionary theory.","PeriodicalId":81088,"journal":{"name":"Denver University law review","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1968424","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Denver University law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1968424","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This response essay identified two objections to Richard Albert’s paper Democratic Revolution and his theory of democratic revolution. First, it observes that democracy is but one desirable aspect of governance and its overemphasis is in considerable tension with the protection of minority interests and the consensus-seeking features of constitutionalism. Second, contrary to Albert's claim, violence and its threat often do attend revolution - whether or not violence or its threat is a defining characteristic of revolution. In light of the undesirability of crass majoritarianism and revolutionary violence, this essay considers whether Albert’s theory could be accommodated either by interpretation-as-amendment or by the Article V method for amending the document. The response concludes that neither would suffice to satisfy the demands of Albert’s democratic revolutionary theory.