Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don't Mix

James A. Gardner
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

It is frequently argued that state constitutions ought to be interpreted using a methodology of constitutional positivism, a familiar and commonplace theory of interpretational legitimacy that requires courts to treat a constitution as an authoritative expression of the will of the people who made it. I argue, contrary to this view, that orthodox constitutional positivism is not a viable interpretational methodology for subnational constitutions in a federal system. Although constitutional positivism makes sense for national constitutions, which furnish the paradigm case, subnational constitutions pose important problems for the political theory upon which constitutional positivism relies. According to that theory, the polity that creates a constitution must be unique, determinate, and self-constructed. These are exactly the conditions that American state polities fail to satisfy, and which cannot be satisfied by any subnational unit in a system of true federalism. In such a system, subnational units are autonomous sovereigns for some purposes but not for others, and thus are simultaneously both independent, autonomously self-governing entities and hierarchically subordinate dependencies of the national government. As a result, national norms are part of the constituting matrix of the state polity, and consequently of its constitution. This in turn means that interpretation of state constitutions inevitably will require at least some resort to national norms and sources of national constitutional meaning. Yet constitutional positivism prohibits such a move, for it forbids the interpretation of one constitution by reference to sources of meaning established by some other polity and appearing in some other constitution. It is telling that one of the most common phenomena in state constitutional law today is so-called "lockstep" interpretation, in which state courts construe provisions of state constitutions to have precisely the same meaning as similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution. For this they have been routinely criticized. My argument here suggests that this criticism is not necessarily well founded.
这是谁的宪法?为什么联邦制和宪法实证主义不能混为一谈
人们经常争辩说,州宪法应该使用宪法实证主义的方法来解释,这是一种熟悉而普通的解释合法性理论,要求法院将宪法视为制定宪法的人意志的权威表达。我认为,与这种观点相反,正统的宪法实证主义并不是联邦制度下地方宪法的一种可行的解释方法。虽然宪法实证主义对国家宪法有意义,提供了范式案例,但地方宪法对宪法实证主义所依赖的政治理论提出了重要问题。根据这一理论,制定宪法的政体必须是独特的、确定的和自我建构的。这些正是美国各州政策无法满足的条件,而在一个真正的联邦制体系中,任何地方单位都无法满足这些条件。在这样一个体系中,次国家单位在某些目的上是自治的主权,但在其他目的上不是,因此同时是独立的、自治的实体,也是国家政府在等级上的从属依赖。因此,国家规范是国家政体的构成矩阵的一部分,因此也是其宪法的组成部分。这反过来意味着,对州宪法的解释将不可避免地需要至少在某种程度上诉诸国家规范和国家宪法含义的来源。然而,宪法实证主义禁止这样的举动,因为它禁止参照由其他政体建立并出现在其他宪法中的意义来源来解释一部宪法。很能说明问题的是,今天州宪法中最常见的现象之一是所谓的“步调一致”解释,即州法院对州宪法条款的解释与美国宪法类似条款的含义完全相同。为此,他们经常受到批评。我在这里的论点是,这种批评不一定是有充分根据的。
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