The Criminal Class Action

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
Adam S. Zimmerman, D. Jaros
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Over the past ten years, in a variety of high-profile corporate scandals, prosecutors have sought billions of dollars in restitution for crimes ranging from environmental dumping and consumer scams to financial fraud. In what we call “criminal class action” settlements, prosecutors distribute that money to groups of victims as in a civil class action while continuing to pursue the traditional criminal justice goals of retribution and deterrence. Unlike civil class actions, however, the emerging criminal class action lacks critical safeguards for victims entitled to compensation. While prosecutors are encouraged, and even required by statute, to seek victim restitution, they lack adequate rules requiring them to (1) coordinate with other civil lawsuits that seek the same relief for victims, (2) hear victims’ claims, (3) identify conflicts between different parties, and (4) divide the award among victims. We argue that prosecutors may continue to play a limited role in compensating victims for widespread harm. However, when prosecutors compensate multiple victims in a criminal class action, prosecutors should adopt rules similar to those that exist in private litigation to ensure that the victims receive fair and efficient compensation. We propose four solutions to give victims more voice in their own redress while preserving prosecutorial discretion: (1) that prosecutors and courts coordinate overlapping settlements before a single federal judge, (2) that prosecutors involve representative stakeholders in settlement discussions through a mediation-like process, (3) that courts subject prosecutors’ distribution plans to independent review to police potential conflicts of interest, and (4) that prosecutors adopt the distribution guidelines the American Law Institute developed for large-scale civil litigation to balance victims’ competing interests.
集体刑事诉讼
在过去的十年里,在一系列备受瞩目的企业丑闻中,检察官要求数十亿美元的赔偿,罪名包括环境污染、消费者欺诈和金融欺诈。在我们所谓的“刑事集体诉讼”和解中,检察官将这笔钱分配给民事集体诉讼中的受害者群体,同时继续追求报复和威慑的传统刑事司法目标。然而,与民事集体诉讼不同,新兴的刑事集体诉讼缺乏对有权获得赔偿的受害者的关键保障。虽然法律鼓励甚至要求检察官寻求受害者的赔偿,但他们缺乏足够的规则来要求他们(1)与其他为受害者寻求同样救济的民事诉讼协调,(2)听取受害者的诉求,(3)确定不同当事人之间的冲突,(4)在受害者之间分配赔偿。我们认为,检察官可能继续发挥有限的作用,赔偿受害者的广泛伤害。但是,在集体刑事诉讼中,对多名受害者进行赔偿时,检察机关应采取与民间诉讼相似的规则,以确保受害者得到公平有效的赔偿。我们提出四项解决方案,让受害者在维护检控自由裁量权的同时,更有发言权:(1)检察官和法院在一名联邦法官面前协调重叠的和解;(2)检察官通过类似调解的程序让利益相关者代表参与和解讨论;(3)法院对检察官的分配计划进行独立审查,以监督潜在的利益冲突;(4)检察官采用美国法律协会为大规模民事诉讼制定的分配准则,以平衡受害者的竞争利益。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
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