The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Brianne J. Gorod
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

The United States’ commitment to adversarial justice is a defining feature of its legal system. Standing doctrine, for example, is supposed to ensure that courts can rely on adverse parties to present the facts courts need to resolve disputes. Although the U.S. legal system generally lives up to this adversarial ideal, it sometimes does not. Appellate courts often look outside the record the parties developed before the trial court, turning instead to their own independent research and to factual claims in amicus briefs. This deviation from the adversarial process is an important respect in which the nation’s adversarial commitment is more myth than reality. This myth is problematic for many reasons, including the fact that it obscures the extent to which some of the most significant cases the Supreme Court decides, such as Citizens United v. FEC, rely upon “facts” that have not been subjected to rigorous adversarial testing. The adversarial myth exists because the U.S. legal system’s current procedures were designed to address adjudicative facts — facts particularly within the knowledge of the parties — but many cases turn instead on legislative facts — more general facts about the state of the world. Recognizing this distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts helps identify those cases in which existing practices undermine, rather than promote, adversarial justice. This Article concludes with suggestions for reform, including liberalizing standing doctrine when legislative facts are at issue. If courts are going to turn to nonparties for help in resolving disputes of legislative fact, it is better that they be brought into the process earlier so the factual claims they offer can be rigorously tested.
对抗性的神话:上诉法院记录外的事实认定
美国对对抗性司法的承诺是其法律制度的一个决定性特征。例如,常备原则应该确保法院可以依靠对方提供法院解决纠纷所需的事实。尽管美国的法律体系总体上符合这种对抗性的理想,但有时却并非如此。上诉法院通常不会参考当事各方在初审法院之前所做的记录,而是求助于他们自己的独立研究和法庭之友简报中的事实主张。这种对对抗过程的偏离是一个重要方面,在这个方面,美国的对抗承诺与其说是现实,不如说是神话。由于许多原因,这个神话是有问题的,包括它模糊了最高法院决定的一些最重要的案件的程度,例如公民联合诉联邦选举委员会,依赖于没有经过严格对抗性测试的“事实”。对抗性神话之所以存在,是因为美国现行法律体系的程序旨在解决裁决事实——特别是当事人所知的事实——但许多案件转而针对立法事实——即有关世界状况的更普遍的事实。认识到裁决事实和立法事实之间的这种区别,有助于查明现有做法破坏而不是促进对抗性司法的那些案件。本文最后提出了改革建议,包括在立法事实存在争议的情况下放宽常设原则。如果法院要向非当事人寻求帮助来解决有关立法事实的争议,最好是让他们更早进入这一程序,这样他们提供的事实主张就能得到严格的检验。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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