The Burdens of Benefits

Abstract

All benefits programs impose burdens on some groups -- those that have to pay to finance them, those that are excluded, those whose conduct is regulated by the benefits program itself. Notions of normative family structure have typically been at the center of American benefits programs. This article compares and contrasts programs that benefit "core" families, with a working man and a stay-at-home wife, with those that benefit "non-core" cases. In each case, one example is drawn from the tax system, one outside. The social security system and marriage bonuses within tax illustrate benefits for the core cases; the welfare/workfare system and the earned income tax system illustrate benefits for non-core cases. In the former case, the status of the programs as benefits ones becomes lost in a reconstituted sense of the status quo or baseline; these programs are taken for granted, their burdens are not noticed, and they are not analyzed as instances of social engineering. In benefits programs for non-core cases, in contrast, the burdens are keenly noticed, support for the programs is fragile, and they are constantly analyzed in consequentialist terms.