Is the regime of control over proliferation of cyber weapons feasible? The Russian and U.S. approaches

Abstract

The article assesses the feasibility of control over proliferation of cyber weapons, by analogy with the control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Russian and U.S. approaches to this issue are considered and compared. While Russia’s stance for a long time proceeded from the idea that the regime of control over proliferation of cyber weapons is needed, the United States have denied the feasibility and validity of this approach. The author argues that, at present, the control over proliferation of cyber weapons and the establishment of a special international regime (by analogy with weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons non-proliferation regimes) is hardly feasible for a number of both technical and political reasons. They include the wide availability of cyber weapons, the scalability effect, and difficulties in identifying cyber weapons. Instead, a special regime of control over the non-use of cyber weapons is proposed. This regime could include, among other things, a ban on cyber attacks against certain targets, introduction of “red lines”, and creation of a unified database of vulnerabilities and malware.