HOW THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC EQUALITY INTRODUCES SUBSTANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURALISM

Abstract

In discussions on democratic legitimacy, Christiano’s position is often characterized as a monistic position, i.e. a strong and persuasive version of fair de- liberative proceduralism. Democracy is thus seen as a realization of public equality in collective decision-making. The presented case for democracy is non-instrumen- tal, and the quality of outcomes produced by a democratic decision-making pro- cess does not constitute or in any way in uence the legitimacy – generating fea- tures of that decision-making process. I argue that the quality of political decisions produced by a democratic decision-making process should play an important (though not decisive) role in Christiano’s argument. Consequently, I claim that his case for democracy should be (at least somewhat) instrumental. I consider four cases from Christiano’s The Constitution of Equality that show how outcomes of democratic procedures are very important to Christiano. Furthermore, I argue that these outcomes are so important that, when deciding between two or more fair decision-making procedures, one that produces the best outcomes should be considered legitimate.