The Pharmaceutical Access Act: An Administrative Eminent Domain Solution to High Drug Prices

IF 2.2 2区社会学 Q1 LAW

California Law Review Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI:10.15779/Z38V97ZR9S

Brittany S. Bruns

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Introduction ........................................................................................... 2024 I. The Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing in the United States: A Broken Market ........................................................................... 2028 II. Market Failure Examples: Hepatitis C Drugs, EpiPen, and Daraprim ................................................................................................... 2033 A. Gilead Sets High Prices for Patented Hepatitis C Treatments 2034 B. Mylan Gradually Aggressively Marketed EpiPens Before Hiking Prices ..................................................................... 2037 C. Turing Leveraged Regulatory Barriers to Increase Price of Daraprim ............................................................................ 2041 III. Current Regulatory Pressure ........................................................... 2044 A. Congressional Hearings ..................................................... 2044 B. Antitrust Laws ................................................................... 2044 C. Targeted Discount and Rebate Programs .......................... 2046 D. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 ................................................................ 2047 1. Problems with Section 1498: Disperse Decision-Making Leads to a Bystander Effect ......................................... 2050 2. Problems with Section 1498: Potential Misapplication to Optimally Incented Products Discourages Investment in Innovation .................................................................... 2050

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药品准入法:高药价的行政征用解决方案

介绍 ...........................................................................................2024 i在美国药品定价的经济学:破碎的市场 ...........................................................................2028二世。市场失灵的例子:丙型肝炎药物,EpiPen, Daraprim ...................................................................................................2033 A。基列集高价专利丙型肝炎治疗2034 b Mylan逐渐积极销售EpiPens徒步旅行之前的价格 .....................................................................2037 c图灵杠杆增加Daraprim价格监管障碍 ............................................................................2041 III。当前的监管压力 ...........................................................2044 A。国会听证会 .....................................................2044 b .反垄断法 ...................................................................2044 c .针对性的折扣和回扣计划 ..........................2046 d . 28事项§1498 ................................................................2047年1。1498年问题部分:分散决策导致了旁观者效应 .........................................2050 2。第1498节:问题潜在的滥用最佳鼓励产品阻碍了对创新的投资 ....................................................................2050

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来源期刊

California Law Review LAW-

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： This review essay considers the state of hybrid democracy in California through an examination of three worthy books: Daniel Weintraub, Party of One: Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Rise of the Independent Voter; Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California"s Fourth Branch of Government (Second Edition), and Mark Baldassare and Cheryl Katz, The Coming of Age of Direct Democracy: California"s Recall and Beyond. The essay concludes that despite the hoopla about Governor Schwarzenegger as a "party of one" and a new age of "hybrid democracy" in California.