Regulating Lobbying in International and Transnational Spheres

Abstract

Lobbying is an integral part of contemporary international processes. Globalization, spread of market relations and transnational links, liberalization of national and supranational governance increased the role of interest groups in international relations. However, interest groups activities at the global level are still largely a terra incognita for international relations theory and international law which requires a more comprehensive analysis. The main goal of the article is to fill the gaps in modern IR theory as well as in theories of lobbying and interest groups by systematization of lobbying regulation experience in international and transnational spheres. Even though single approach towards formalization of international lobbying is hardly feasible, systematization of current global practices should facilitate better understanding of the nature of interest groups activity in international and transnational spheres, of potential and limits for its regulation both in sovereign states and international organizations. The article analyzes separate regulatory regimes aimed at formalizing lobbying in international and transnational spheres. There are two types of regimes: those existing on supranational level that set rules of interaction between interest groups and international organizations; those that regulate interactions of foreign interest groups and sovereign states. Analysis has demonstrated that supranational and national authorities have different approaches towards regulating their interactions with transnational interest groups. Moreover, difference exists not only between these two levels but within levels. I study supranational regulation with the cases of the European Union and the United Nations. The EU is an example of the most inclusive regulatory regime within the international organization. It technically covers all types of interest groups that wish to lobby EU officials. The UN takes a different approach – it officially regulates interactions only with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). However, real interests behind INGOs include not only public interests but also business groups. There is an unfolding discussion within the UN over what should be the right approach towards regulating business interests. Various UN bodies have varying opinions on the issue that results in existence of various sub-regimes in the organization. The analysis of foreign lobbying regulation regimes in sovereign states has demonstrated that their development is connected mainly to political motivations of national authorities who wish to limit political and information influence by foreign interest groups while leaving economic ties and interaction with foreign business groups relatively immune to such regulation.