Noncooperative and Cooperative Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

IF 0.2 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Kosuke Hirose, Sang‐Ho Lee, Toshihiro Matsumura
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引用次数: 32

Abstract

We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition.
非合作与合作的环境企业社会责任
我们制定了几个数量和价格竞争模型来调查企业在市场竞争中对环境企业社会责任(ECSR)的采用。首先,我们考虑排放上限承诺。在数量竞争条件下,共同利润最大化的行业协会采用ECSR,因为它具有弱化数量竞争的作用。然而,如果没有行业协会,它是不会被采用的。而在价格竞争条件下,个别企业在没有行业协会参与的情况下自愿采用企业社会责任,在有行业协会参与的情况下选择更高水平的企业社会责任。其次,我们考虑了排放强度承诺(对每产出排放量的承诺),并发现它不太可能限制市场竞争。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
8
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