The social meaning of the Norplant condition: constitutional considerations of race, class, and gender.

Abstract

Copyright © 1994, BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL. t Ph.D. cand., Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J. D., Boalt Hall School of Law, 1993; M.A., Stanford University, 1989. I would like to thank Professor Chris Littleton and Professor Reva Siegel for their comments and encouragement. Thanks also to Jin Won and Kaaryn Gustafson for their critical appraisal and helpful suggestions. I would like to acknowledge my editor, Laura Parsky, as this article benefited immensely from her intelligence and persistence. Most of all, I thank Marc Melnick for reading numerous drafts, encouraging me to submit this piece for publication, and caring for me along the way. I ALoous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 7 (1946). 2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing privacy