{"title":"Der Balkan zwischen Ost und West. Mediale Bilder und kulturpolitische Prägungen","authors":"J. Fiedler","doi":"10.1515/soeu-2016-0038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"mands further alignment of fiscal policies and transfer of funds from core countries (northern Europe) of the EU to the periphery (southern Europe) in order to facilitate further convergence. Furthermore, Simitis explains the inability of the mentioned Troika to come up with more permanent solutions to the Greek debt crisis under political pressure from the different European member states. The European Council refused to provide debt relief in fear of losses for private banks that could potentially destabilise their own respective economies further than the global financial crisis already had. These are commonly held insights, but the focus on ‘the Greek case’ does make the policy-making and the relation between the EU institutions and national governments more tangible. As the book progresses, Simitis eventually showcases his vision for a more balanced EU framework. Simitis was a third-way social democrat during the 1990s, however in this book he first and foremost presents himself as a European minded politician, as is evident from the scarceness of ideologically coloured statements. He understands the limits of EU policy-makers; however he has enough political insight to criticise the EU technocrats. The first memorandum, which the Troika and Greece signed on 7 May 2010, was ‘a medicine with dangerous side effects’ according to Simitis (53). It imposed austerity without lightening the burden of public debt, thereby aggravating the crisis in Greece as well as in the EU. The crisis spread to Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, only emphasising the need for a European solution. Simitis argues that ‘despite the idiosyncratic qualities of the Greek problem, it did not constitute an isolated case’ (73). Rather, it resulted from the more basic shortcomings of the EMU. The first chapter of the final part of the book concludes the analysis of the Greek crisis, the second that of the European crisis. He synthesises his argument as: ‘Greece triggered the crisis in the Eurozone, but was not the cause of it. [...] The cause is inherent in the fact that the Eurozone is a full monetary union but an imperfect economic and fiscal union [...]; the mature economies of the European North differ significantly from the less mature economies of the South’ (322). In the final chapter, Simitis shows his true colours. He denounces the constrictive technocratic vision of conservative Europeans who have dominated the European Council and Commission since the referenda in 2005, when France and the Netherlands rejected the adoption of the European constitution. With this book, Simitis joins the call for ‘escaping forwards’, which means that the crisis should be used to advance ‘economic governance’ and ‘political union’ in the EU (338). The book is a consistent analysis of the Greek debt crisis and presents a progressive European perspective. A perspective that all too often seems to be lost amid the Euroscepticism and resulting conservatism surrounding the EU these days.","PeriodicalId":51954,"journal":{"name":"Sudosteuropa","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/soeu-2016-0038","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sudosteuropa","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2016-0038","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
mands further alignment of fiscal policies and transfer of funds from core countries (northern Europe) of the EU to the periphery (southern Europe) in order to facilitate further convergence. Furthermore, Simitis explains the inability of the mentioned Troika to come up with more permanent solutions to the Greek debt crisis under political pressure from the different European member states. The European Council refused to provide debt relief in fear of losses for private banks that could potentially destabilise their own respective economies further than the global financial crisis already had. These are commonly held insights, but the focus on ‘the Greek case’ does make the policy-making and the relation between the EU institutions and national governments more tangible. As the book progresses, Simitis eventually showcases his vision for a more balanced EU framework. Simitis was a third-way social democrat during the 1990s, however in this book he first and foremost presents himself as a European minded politician, as is evident from the scarceness of ideologically coloured statements. He understands the limits of EU policy-makers; however he has enough political insight to criticise the EU technocrats. The first memorandum, which the Troika and Greece signed on 7 May 2010, was ‘a medicine with dangerous side effects’ according to Simitis (53). It imposed austerity without lightening the burden of public debt, thereby aggravating the crisis in Greece as well as in the EU. The crisis spread to Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, only emphasising the need for a European solution. Simitis argues that ‘despite the idiosyncratic qualities of the Greek problem, it did not constitute an isolated case’ (73). Rather, it resulted from the more basic shortcomings of the EMU. The first chapter of the final part of the book concludes the analysis of the Greek crisis, the second that of the European crisis. He synthesises his argument as: ‘Greece triggered the crisis in the Eurozone, but was not the cause of it. [...] The cause is inherent in the fact that the Eurozone is a full monetary union but an imperfect economic and fiscal union [...]; the mature economies of the European North differ significantly from the less mature economies of the South’ (322). In the final chapter, Simitis shows his true colours. He denounces the constrictive technocratic vision of conservative Europeans who have dominated the European Council and Commission since the referenda in 2005, when France and the Netherlands rejected the adoption of the European constitution. With this book, Simitis joins the call for ‘escaping forwards’, which means that the crisis should be used to advance ‘economic governance’ and ‘political union’ in the EU (338). The book is a consistent analysis of the Greek debt crisis and presents a progressive European perspective. A perspective that all too often seems to be lost amid the Euroscepticism and resulting conservatism surrounding the EU these days.