Tradable Permits versus Tradable Credits: A Survey and Analysis

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS
A. Nentjes, E. Woerdman
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

This article compares tradable permits with tradable credits, two distinct economic instruments of environmental policy. It is demonstrated that under credit trading, which is an addition to (relative) emission standards, residual emissions are free of cost. Under permit trading (cap-and-trade), residual emissions always have a cost. The economic consequences of this difference are surveyed and analyzed with regard to various issues, including economic efficiency, political acceptance, incentives for adopting clean technologies, and incentives for legal compliance. The review concludes that permit trading is less costly to society than credit trading, but imperfect markets for output may change this ranking. The article reveals several gaps in the literature and formulates some new hypotheses for future research.
可交易许可与可交易信用:调查与分析
本文比较了可交易许可和可交易信用这两种截然不同的环境政策经济工具。结果表明,在信用交易下,作为对(相对)排放标准的补充,剩余排放是免费的。在许可交易(限额与交易)下,剩余排放总是要付出代价的。对这一差异的经济后果进行了调查和分析,涉及各种问题,包括经济效率、政治接受、采用清洁技术的奖励和遵守法律的奖励。报告的结论是,许可证交易的社会成本低于信用交易,但不完善的产出市场可能会改变这一排名。本文揭示了文献中的一些空白,并为未来的研究提出了一些新的假设。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
期刊介绍: Environmental and resource economics has become a broad topic making connections with many other subdisciplines in economics as well as the natural and physical sciences. It has also experience a significant growth in research such that the literature is exploding in terms of the number of topics addressed, the number of methodological approaches being applied and the sheer number of articles being written. Coupled with the high degree of specialization that characterizes modern academic research, this proliferation of topics and methodologies makes it impossible for anyone, even those who specialize in the subject, to keep up with developments in the field.
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