Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation

IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
Peter Forrest
{"title":"Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation","authors":"Peter Forrest","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-2017","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-2017","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2017","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism.
中性主义、自然主义与涌现:对康柏实例化理论的批判性考察
在他的《属性是特殊的、普遍的还是两者都不是?》哈维尔·坎帕认为,科学而不是形而上学解释了属性是如何实例化的。我接受这个结论,前提是物理学可以用相当少的原始谓词来陈述。此外,他用他的实例化科学理论来为中立主义辩护,他的论点是,属性和它们的实例之间的“联系”既不意味着属性是特殊的,也不意味着它们是普遍的。我认为,中立主义是这样一种命题,即关于共相的现实主义者有独立的理由接受它们,而它们的反对者有理由拒绝它们。所以,中性主义在属性是否为共相的问题上并不中立。康帕的实例化理论也不像他声称的那样自然主义。我认为,尽管他的理论与本体论自然主义相容,但他的理论为精神属性的非自然出现提供了一个先例。最后,我认为,因为他的理论需要一个简单的物理学,它预设了一个比方法论自然主义更理性的认识论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信