Cerebros y experiencias: Una defensa del modelo no posesivo del yo

Abstract

espanolEn este articulo se argumenta a favor del modelo no posesivo del Yo. Se presenta la critica de P. Strawson (1967, 1989) a este modelo, para elaborar un defensa que descansa en una tesis de posesion cerebral, la cual supone que las experiencias, en cuanto entidades ontologicamente no-suficientes, dependen para su existencia e identidadde la existencia de un cerebro particular. EnglishIn the present investigation we will present arguments in favor of the no-ownership model of self. We will initially present the criticism that Strawson (1967, 1989) makes to this model, to present a defense that rests on a thesis of cerebral possession, thatassumes that the experiences as non-sufficiency ontological entities depend for their existence and identity on the existence of a particular brain.