{"title":"Naturalism, Transcendental Conditions, and the Self-Discipline of Philosophical Reason","authors":"Sami Pihlstrom","doi":"10.1353/jsp.2001.0031","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Naturalism has been the received metaphilosophical view within epistemology and the philosophy of science since the 1980s. In brief, it urges that science (and our knowledge acquisition in general) is an element of the natural world along with everything else. There is no privileged, aprioristic point of view of “first philosophy” over and above our empirical science itself, although such a standpoint is still assumed, in different ways, by old-fashioned empiricists, epistemological foundationalists, Popperian critical rationalists, and many contemporary scientific realists—in short, by most traditional analytic philosophers. Instead, science must be investigated scientifically; a scientific theory of science should be our aim. This kind of naturalistic program has been defended by, among others, Ronald Giere (1988) and Richard Boyd (1992). We may also classify Arthur Fine’s (1996) “nonrealistic” or “postrealistic” and postphilosophical “natural ontological attitude” (NOA) as a species of naturalism in this sense. According to Fine, all attempts to interpret and justify science philosophically, from a higher perspective lying outside science, are in vain. n n n J S P","PeriodicalId":44744,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"228 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/jsp.2001.0031","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Speculative Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2001.0031","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
Naturalism has been the received metaphilosophical view within epistemology and the philosophy of science since the 1980s. In brief, it urges that science (and our knowledge acquisition in general) is an element of the natural world along with everything else. There is no privileged, aprioristic point of view of “first philosophy” over and above our empirical science itself, although such a standpoint is still assumed, in different ways, by old-fashioned empiricists, epistemological foundationalists, Popperian critical rationalists, and many contemporary scientific realists—in short, by most traditional analytic philosophers. Instead, science must be investigated scientifically; a scientific theory of science should be our aim. This kind of naturalistic program has been defended by, among others, Ronald Giere (1988) and Richard Boyd (1992). We may also classify Arthur Fine’s (1996) “nonrealistic” or “postrealistic” and postphilosophical “natural ontological attitude” (NOA) as a species of naturalism in this sense. According to Fine, all attempts to interpret and justify science philosophically, from a higher perspective lying outside science, are in vain. n n n J S P
自20世纪80年代以来,自然主义一直是认识论和科学哲学中公认的形而上学观点。简而言之,它敦促科学(以及我们一般的知识获取)与其他一切一样,都是自然界的一个元素。在我们的经验科学本身之上,并没有特权的、先验的“第一哲学”观点,尽管这种观点仍然以不同的方式被老式的经验主义者、认识论基础主义者、波普尔批判理性主义者和许多当代科学现实主义者——简而言之,被大多数传统的分析哲学家所采用。相反,必须科学地研究科学;科学的理论应该是我们的目标。罗纳德·吉尔(Ronald Giere, 1988)和理查德·博伊德(Richard Boyd, 1992)等人为这种自然主义的计划进行了辩护。我们也可以将Arthur Fine(1996)的“非现实主义”或“后现实主义”和后哲学的“自然本体论态度”(NOA)归类为这种意义上的自然主义。凡恩认为,所有试图从科学之外的更高视角来哲学地解释和证明科学的努力都是徒劳的。n n n J S P