Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders

Abstract

Abstract The author responds to Hill et al.'s “Gender Identity Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence: A Critical Inquiry” and Moser and Kleinplatz's “DSM-IV-TRand the Paraphilias: An Argument for Removal.” The author sees the paper as raising the issue of whether there are any cases for which sexual and gender identity diagnoses are appropriate. The author believes a central issue is how does one decide that something is just unusual (normal variation) or something is disordered (pathological). The author believes the concept of “medical disorder” can be applied to human behavior and gives examples to support that view. The author supports an essentialist view that some “things” (like being human and modes of sexual expression) have properties or qualities that are invariable and represent the true essence of the “thing.” From this perspective, the author finds the arguments for eliminating the categories of GID and paraphilias from the DSM as weak at best.