'Nothing is so soon forgot as pain': Reading Agony in Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Abstract

Giving a rigorous philosophical explanation to the imagination's role in sympathy, Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments became a central text in Romantic aesthetics. It not only justified the age's vogue for making suffering an object of artistic pleasure, it treated suffering's affectivity as the very foundation of society. Depicting agony as a spectacle to be read by others, Smith transformed morality into rhetoric, making human subjects into readers of a sentimentalised, textual world. Yet Smith's work restricted the bonds of sympathy, too, following established distinctions between mind and body that helped him to exclude physical pain from sympathetic response. This essay looks to Smith's context in the overlapping philosophical and medical discourses of the Scottish Enlightenment, exploring his moral theory's resonance with the nerve theories of Robert Whytt and William Cullen, then the leading figures in Scotland's rising medical community. Deepening our understanding of Smith's probable sources, it reframes Smith's intellectual and ideological legacy, foregrounding some of the ambivalent cultural and political implications of Smith's troubling censure of physical pain.