Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

IF 0.4 Q4 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2003-09-01 DOI:10.1142/S0219198903001057

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

引用次数: 8

Abstract

This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of sym- metric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equi- libria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 x 2 case, both im- itation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.

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有限种群动力学与混合均衡

本文研究了对称博弈的混合策略纳什均衡的稳定性，将其视为在单个有限种群中具有学习的动态系统中的种群概况。考虑了模仿和近视最佳回答的备选模型，并结合了对调整速度的不同假设。研究发现，混合纳什均衡的特定改进有助于在一般博弈中确定这些动态的焦点休息点。研究了这两个概念之间的关系。在2 × 2的情况下，对于同一类型的混合纳什均衡，激励和短视最佳对策都产生了很强的稳定性结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Game Theory Review MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Rapid developments in technology, communication, industrial organization, economic integration, political reforms and international trade have made it increasingly imperative to recognize the causes and effects of strategic interdependencies and interactions. A strategic approach to decision-making is crucial in areas such as trade negotiations, foreign and domestic investments, capital accumulation, pollution control, market integration, regional cooperation, development and implementation of new technology, arms control, international resource extraction, network sharing, and competitive marketing. Since its inception, game theory has contributed significantly to the foundations of decision-making.