Boundary Standoff and China-India Relations: A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective

Abstract

The China-Indian boundary and territorial dispute is one of the major issues affecting Sino-Indian bilateral relations. This issue was a legacy of the British colonialists, but unfortunately, it has been fully inherited by the Indian ruling class. Over the past 60 years, China and India have missed three opportunities to resolve this issue. The Indian ruling class wanted to achieve “absolute security” and therefore introduced a “forward policy”, which led to the 1962 conflict. After the war, India occupied almost all of the strategic commanding heights in the border area between the two countries by continuously encroaching on Chinese territory and pushing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) toward the Chinese side. After Prime Minister Modi came to power in 2014, he adopted the Doval Doctrine and “offensive defense” policy in the border area, with a view to continuing the encroachment on Chinese territory and occupying the strategic commanding heights. The aim was to force China to resolve the border issue in accordance with India’s intentions, so that India can then shift its strategic focus to the Indian Ocean. China-U.S. strategic rivalry and Hindu nationalism have fueled India’s behavior in the border region, and the peaceful resolution of the 2017 Donglang/Doklam standoff has emboldened India, making the bloodshed in Galwan Valley an inevitable incident. That India’s Home Minister Amit Shah categorically declared in August 2019 in Parliament that Aksai Chin was part of new Ladakh Union Territory shows that the Indian government has restored its position on the western sector boundary that the Vajpayee Administration had abandoned in 2003. India is using the Galwan conflict as an excuse to pursue its policy of economic de-Sinicization and strategic alliance with the U.S. and other Western countries. In the future, China-Indian border conflict is likely to become commonplace due to India’s expansionism.