Rescuing the Budget Process

Pub Date : 2012-09-01 DOI:10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X
A. Rivlin
{"title":"Rescuing the Budget Process","authors":"A. Rivlin","doi":"10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that the budget process is broken. Congress has not even tried to agree on a Budget Resolution—the normal first step in the annual budget process–for several years. Instead, hopes of a major agreement designed to stabilize the rising debt have rested on the creation of special mechanisms outside the regular budget process. First there was the President’s Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson Bowles Commission) in 2010. When no legislative action followed that report, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden tried to hammer out a deal withHouse and senate leadership. ThenU.S. President Barack H. Obama and U.S. Speaker John Boehner worked together on a “grand bargain” both political parties could accept. After these efforts failed—and the debt ceiling debacle in the fall summer of 2011 showed how deeply broken regular congressional processes had become—hopes were pinned on yet another special committee. Legislation created the Joint Select Committee (JSC), dubbed the “Super Committee,” and gave it a tight deadline and truly extraordinary powers. Optimists thought that the JSC might succeed. If it had had strong from the president and the leadership in both houses, it might indeed have been able to agree on actions to stabilize the rising debt and use its powers to set the federal budget on a sustainable path. But that support did not materialize, gridlock prevailed, and the JSC became one more entry on a list of failures. Gridlock is likely to last at least through the 2012 presidential election, perhaps longer. But even if one of these extraordinary mechanisms had succeeded in reaching a “grand bargain,” this dismal history simply illustrates how completely the normal budget process has failed. Our much-vaunted democracy should not have to abandon its normal decision processes and concentrate power in the hands of an ad hoc group to solve a budget problem.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1540-5850.2012.01017.X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

There is no doubt that the budget process is broken. Congress has not even tried to agree on a Budget Resolution—the normal first step in the annual budget process–for several years. Instead, hopes of a major agreement designed to stabilize the rising debt have rested on the creation of special mechanisms outside the regular budget process. First there was the President’s Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson Bowles Commission) in 2010. When no legislative action followed that report, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden tried to hammer out a deal withHouse and senate leadership. ThenU.S. President Barack H. Obama and U.S. Speaker John Boehner worked together on a “grand bargain” both political parties could accept. After these efforts failed—and the debt ceiling debacle in the fall summer of 2011 showed how deeply broken regular congressional processes had become—hopes were pinned on yet another special committee. Legislation created the Joint Select Committee (JSC), dubbed the “Super Committee,” and gave it a tight deadline and truly extraordinary powers. Optimists thought that the JSC might succeed. If it had had strong from the president and the leadership in both houses, it might indeed have been able to agree on actions to stabilize the rising debt and use its powers to set the federal budget on a sustainable path. But that support did not materialize, gridlock prevailed, and the JSC became one more entry on a list of failures. Gridlock is likely to last at least through the 2012 presidential election, perhaps longer. But even if one of these extraordinary mechanisms had succeeded in reaching a “grand bargain,” this dismal history simply illustrates how completely the normal budget process has failed. Our much-vaunted democracy should not have to abandon its normal decision processes and concentrate power in the hands of an ad hoc group to solve a budget problem.
分享
查看原文
拯救预算程序
毫无疑问,预算程序已经失灵。几年来,国会甚至都没有试图就预算决议达成一致——这是年度预算过程中正常的第一步。相反,达成旨在稳定不断上升的债务的重大协议的希望,一直依赖于在常规预算程序之外建立特别机制。首先是2010年成立的总统财政责任与改革委员会(辛普森·鲍尔斯委员会)。这份报告之后没有立法行动,美国副总统乔·拜登试图与众议院和参议院领导层达成协议。ThenU.S。美国总统奥巴马和众议院议长博纳共同制定了一项两党都能接受的“大妥协”。在这些努力失败之后——2011年秋夏的债务上限崩溃表明了常规国会程序已经变得多么支离破碎——希望寄托在了另一个特别委员会上。立法创建了联合特别委员会(JSC),被称为“超级委员会”,并给了它一个紧迫的截止日期和真正的非凡权力。乐观主义者认为JSC可能会成功。如果它得到了总统和参众两院领导层的大力支持,它或许确实能够就稳定不断上升的债务的行动达成一致,并利用其权力将联邦预算设定在一条可持续的道路上。但这种支持并没有实现,僵局占据了上风,JSC成为失败名单上的又一个条目。僵局可能至少会持续到2012年总统大选,甚至更长。但是,即使这些非同寻常的机制中有一个成功地达成了“大妥协”,这段令人沮丧的历史也仅仅说明了正常的预算程序是如何彻底失败的。我们大肆吹嘘的民主不应该放弃其正常的决策程序,把权力集中在一个特设小组手中来解决预算问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信