Notice of Errata

A. Woolley, B. Alarie, Andrew Green, Edward M. Iacobucci, Sari Graben, Abbey Sinclair, Benjamin H. Barton, H. Lockett, Charles T. Lockett
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Abstract

No one doubts that lawyers have fiduciary duties. Yet the justification for and scope of those duties is surprisingly unclear. Case law grounds fiduciary duties in the fiduciary’s exercise of discretionary authority. But discretionary authority is only an occasional – and sometimes ethically problematic – aspect of the lawyer’s role, not its defining feature. Further, case law has been neither clear nor consistent in defining the specific obligations that attach to the lawyer’s duty of fiduciary loyalty. Academic literature on fiduciary duties provides only a partial and somewhat unsatisfactory explanation for the lawyer’s fiduciary status when viewed in light of the normative foundations of the lawyer’s role and case law. Academic literature on the lawyer’s role is, however, also unsatisfactory insofar as, while it explains the lawyer’s duty of loyalty, it does not provide any means for analysing how breaches of that duty ought to be categorized in private law. The article attempts to reduce the confusion over the meaning and extent of the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations. It argues that the content of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties should be informed by the normative structure of fiduciary obligations and by the normative structure of the lawyer–client relationship. The lawyer–client relationship operates at the intersection of private obligation and public duty, and the scope and force of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties reflect that intersection. When understood in this way, the principle underlying the lawyer’s fiduciary status continues to emphasize discretion. It focuses, however, not on the lawyer’s exercise of discretion but rather on the lawyer’s provision of the advice and advocacy necessary for the client’s exercise of discretion. Analysed in light of these founding principles, lawyers ought to be held liable for fiduciary breach in three circumstances: (1) where they violate obligations to clients as a consequence of a conflict of interest or duty; (2) where they undercut the very nature of the representation they undertook to provide; and (3) where, through failing to provide information or providing the client with misinformation, they undermine the client’s ability to make decisions.
勘误通知
没有人怀疑律师负有受托责任。然而,这些关税的理由和范围却令人惊讶地不清楚。判例法将信义义务置于受托人行使自由裁量权的基础之上。但自由裁量权只是律师角色中偶尔出现的一个方面,有时还会出现道德问题,而不是其决定性特征。此外,判例法既不明确也不一致地界定了附属于律师的受托忠诚义务的具体义务。从律师角色和判例法的规范基础来看,关于信义义务的学术文献只对律师的信义地位提供了部分的、有些令人不满意的解释。然而,关于律师角色的学术文献也不令人满意,因为虽然它解释了律师的忠诚义务,但它没有提供任何方法来分析违反该义务的行为应如何在私法中分类。本文试图减少对律师信义义务的含义和范围的混淆。认为律师信义义务的内容应受到信义义务规范结构和律师-委托人关系规范结构的影响。律师与委托人的关系是在私人义务和公共责任的交叉点上运作的,律师信义义务的范围和效力反映了这种交叉点。当以这种方式理解时,律师受信人地位的基本原则继续强调自由裁量权。然而,它的重点不是律师行使自由裁量权,而是律师为委托人行使自由裁量权提供必要的咨询意见和辩护。根据这些基本原则进行分析,律师应在三种情况下对违反信义行为承担责任:(1)由于利益冲突或责任冲突而违反对客户的义务;(二)损害其承诺提供的代理的性质;(3)不向客户提供信息或向客户提供错误信息,损害客户决策能力的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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