The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought

Abstract

War, whether or not we like to acknowledge it, has left a transcendent imprint on our lives. Many of our most important and cherished institutions, processes, and inventions have been influenced or modified by war, just as war has been decisively altered by them. Because of the nature of that interaction--of the constant push and pull of those forces--society's interest in armed conflict has forever persisted. Yet, not all elements of the study of war have been treated with the equivalence they deserve. Historically, the study, appreciation, and understanding of strategy and strategic thought have often failed to keep stride with the torrid pace of the evolution of war itself. Indeed, the study of strategy has often been exiled to the lecture halls of military academies, war colleges, and a precious handful of civilian universities. Fortunately, that trend has slowly begun to swing upward, as has the number of scholarly works devoted to those neglected subjects. One such work is The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought by Lukas Milevski. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] While primarily targeted toward advanced, serious-minded strategy scholars, Milevski's book nevertheless remains accessible to any readers interested in grand strategy, tracing the development of grand strategic thought, mostly in the English-speaking world, during the last 200 years. Whereas the first half of the book examines strategic thinking from the Napoleonic Wars until the latter part of World War II, the second half explores the decline of grand strategic thinking during the initial stages of the Cold War before charting its reemergence toward the end of the conflict. A closing chapter assesses the continued interest in strategic thought after the Cold War. In addition to providing its intellectual history, Milevski offers a clear, compelling critique of grand strategic thinking. He argues that grand-strategy theorists, driven by a pressing desire to solve immediate problems, have become so consumed in their present circumstances they have seldom looked to history and theory for guidance. Although this oversight might not initially seem like a cause for concern, Milevski makes the case that such emphasis on solving today's problems has prompted scholars to be predominantly ahistorical in their search for solutions. If Milevski is correct, then truly understanding today's grand strategies does not require us to understand the history and theoretical underpinnings of the past; on the contrary, it requires an appreciation of current geopolitical realities. …