The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro district

Abstract

Abstract Located along the border with West Timor, Bobonaro district consistently rated among the districts with the highest incidences of political violence during the Unamet-run Popular Consultation. Elite members of the District Administration, who stood to lose all if the autonomy option lost, and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), who would have to withdraw from East Timor, pulled out all stops to improve the chances of an autonomy vote. A parallel track of coercion and violence was pursued through militia proxies to ensure the systematic control of the whole population while irreversibly altering the political space in favor of the pro-autonomy cause. The TNI-militia relationship was anchored in strategies devised as far back as 1994: home-grown East Timorese forces would bear the brunt of field and urban operations against Falintil and pro-independence supporters. However, attempts to develop the militia into an institution in its own right, separate from the TNI, ultimately failed during Unamet's tenure. Over the different phases of the Consultation the militia groups gradually fell apart. The East Timorese people and rank and file militia members passively rejected their instructions and ultimately many left the organization. By the time of the Consultation on 30 August 1999 the TNI and the Indonesian Police (Polri), including East Timorese in both units, became increasingly responsible for all violence and intimidation. The precision and confidence with which they executed their strategies indicates coordination from the highest levels.