Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

IF 10.1 2区心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL

European Review of Social Psychology Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI:10.1080/10463283.2016.1249640

E. Krockow, A. Colman, B. Pulford

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引用次数: 24

Abstract

ABSTRACT Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.

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重复互动中的合作:1992-2016年蜈蚣游戏实验的系统回顾

合作是社会互动的一种基本形式，轮流互惠是其最常见的表现之一。蜈蚣游戏提供了这种交替互惠合作的正式模型，但逆向归纳(BI)论点似乎从逻辑上证明了工具理性的玩家永远不会以这种方式合作。对实验研究的系统回顾表明，人类决策者在这个游戏中经常合作，除非在某些极端条件下。研究了博弈变量、情境变量和个体差异变量对合作的影响。最具影响力的是收益函数(游戏邦注:尤其是合作带来的社会收益和与合作行动相关的风险)、玩家数量、游戏重复次数、群体vs个人决策以及玩家的社会价值取向。我们对实验证据的回顾表明，与他人相关的偏好，包括亲社会行为倾向和集体理性，为合作提供了最有力的解释。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

European Review of Social Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL-

CiteScore

15.30

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The "European Review of Social Psychology (ERSP)" is a distinguished international journal that operates under the patronage of the European Association of Social Psychology. It serves as a platform for comprehensive, theory-driven reviews that cover the broad spectrum of social psychology. The journal is open to submissions from authors worldwide and is guided by a prestigious international editorial board. ERSP is particularly interested in publishing reviews that reflect the author's own research program, as demonstrated by their publications in leading peer-reviewed journals. The journal values theoretical contributions that are grounded in a substantial empirical foundation, situating the research within the broader context of existing literature and offering a synthesis that goes beyond the individual articles. In addition to these in-depth reviews, ERSP also welcomes conventional reviews and meta-analyses, further enriching the journal's offerings. By focusing on high-quality, evidence-based research, ERSP contributes significantly to the advancement of knowledge in social psychology and fosters a deeper understanding of human social behavior across cultures and societies.